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Introduction
Exploring the potential links between the financial structure and aggregate economic
behavior has long been a topic of interest in the literature.1 This is partly due to
the fact that financial markets and institutions have been considered to have signifi-
cant effects on economic growth and output fluctuations.2 It is also the consequence
of developments in the academic work: empirically, the historical and postwar data
providing support for further research in this area; theoretically, advances in the
macroeconomic modelling allowing analyses of such issues. The importance of the
functioning of financial markets in explaining economic phenomena has been pointed
out by economists since the Great Depression, as discussed below. The behavior of the
financial markets was claimed to be responsible for the extraordinary events of the
time during the Great Depression. However, the Keynesian revolution interrupted
the line of research in this direction, attracting attention to other issues like mar-
ket imperfections and state intervention, while admitting the relevance of financial
elements. The strong emphasis on money and monetary issues, following Keynes’
liquidity preference theory, overshadowed the relevance of the financial markets for
aggregate economic activity until the late 1970s. The methodological developments in
the theory and new empirical work aroused interest again in studying the financial as-
pects of the business cycle through the end of 1970s. However, the real business cycle
(RBC, henceforth) literature that was set off by the pioneering works by Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986) continued to assume perfect financial markets,
ignoring the relevance of financial structure. It was not before the 1990s that models
featuring both heterogeneity and frictions such as asymmetric information or costly
contract enforcement (required to make financial structure relevant) were started to
be developed.
The literature on the interaction between financial structure and aggregate fluctua-
tions goes back to the time of the Great Depression. The simultaneous collapse of
the financial system and the destruction of the real economic activity attracted the
attention of economists. Fisher (1933) argued that the severe consequences of the
economic crash were mainly due to the poorly functioning financial markets. The im-
portance of the financial system in shaping the aggregate economic activity was not
1For a comprehensive survey on the interaction between financial structure and aggregate eco-
nomic activity, see Gertler (1988). For an analysis on the interaction between financial intermediation
and aggregate fluctuations, see Cooley and Nam (1998).
2See, among others, Levine (1997).
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explicitly stated in Keynes’ theory of output determination. However, it constituted
a part of the theory of investment behavior introduced in the General Theory. Key-
nesian investment theory emphasized the importance of lender-borrower confidence
as a key determinant of investment. The literature following the General Theory
concentrated mainly on money as the most relevant financial variable to aggregate
economic behavior, ignoring the links between output behavior and the rest of the
financial fundamentals. Hicks (1937) and Modigliani (1944), among others, showed
the relationship between the demand for and the supply of real money balances, and
the real interest rate.
Regarding the mechanism linking money to the real economy, different approaches
were taken by the early Keynesians and the Monetarists. The former emphasized
the role of real factors such as the multiplier/accelerator mechanism and fiscal pol-
icy, whereas the latter advocated the importance of the monetary mechanism. The
famous time series study by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provided evidence for the
fact that money supply declined dramatically together with output during the Great
Depression. This empirical evidence and the liquidity preference theory of Keynes
created a research environment in favor of monetary issues, distracting the interest
on the other aspects of the financial system.
Starting with the study by Gurley and Shaw (1955), the interaction between finan-
cial structure and real activity became an attractive research topic again. Gurley
and Shaw stressed especially the significance of financial intermediation in the credit
supply process as opposed to the money supply process. They argued that financial
intermediaries improved the efficiency of intertemporal trade and thereby affected
general economic activity. They also noted that, as financial intermediation evolved
due to financial development, lending institutions with nonmonetary liabilities arose,
and therefore, the importance of money diminished. Furthermore, they referred to
the ”overall financial capacity” of the economy as one of the most important deter-
minants of aggregate demand and claimed that financial intermediaries were crucial
for the system due to the fact that they extended borrowers’ financial capacity.
The potential relevance of financial structure for real economy received a blow, how-
ever, shortly after the study of Gurley and Shaw, as Modigliani and Miller (MM,
henceforth) (1958) provided a formal proposition showing that real economic deci-
sions were independent of financial structure. Although the framework of the MM
theorem, which was based on the Arrow-Debreu world, was different than that Gurley
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and Shaw had in mind, the theorem was formally powerful enough to convince the
researchers to abstract from the complications resulting from financial considerations.
The fact that the only available and tractable model, which the stochastic competitive
equilibrium growth models of the time were based on, was the Arrow-Debreu model
that ignored the relevance of financial structure for aggregate economic activity, led
to further disregard of financial aspects of the economy in the academic world. An-
other reason behind the fact that financial structure was neglected was the technical
difficulty of endogenizing the financial system, i.e., the financial institutions. The the-
oretical techniques required for modeling were not adequately developed; therefore,
heterogeneity (needed to be able to motivate trade/borrowing-lending among agents)
and financial frictions could not be captured analytically. Finally, developments in
the empirical literature also affected the research agenda of the economists. More
specifically, the increasing use of vector autoregressions of time series to investigate
links between money and output, initiated by Sims (1972), deemphasized the poten-
tial role of the rest of the financial system on real economy.
Starting from the late 1970s, new developments in both the theoretical and the em-
pirical literature managed to attract the attention of the economists to the aspects of
the financial system other than money. The new empirical literature investigating the
relationship between the financial markets and the business cycle concentrated first
on the interaction between financial factors, output and consumer spending. Mishkin
(1978) analyzed data from the Great Depression to uncover, if there are any, the ef-
fects of financial factors on output and consumption. He found that the net financial
positions of households did have a significant impact on consumer demand. Addi-
tionally, he provided evidence for a financial propagation mechanism, according to
which the decline in demand was amplified by the rise in consumer real indebtedness
resulting from decreasing income levels and deflation. In his famous paper, Bernanke
(1983) examined the role played by financial factors during the Great Depression. He
showed that financial collapse had a significant impact on the economy and that the
depression could not be explained quantitatively by monetary factors only. He argued
that the crash of financial intermediation had real implications for the economy since
it destroyed the channels through which financial resources were transferred among
the sectors of the economy. Sims (1980) provided new empirical evidence from the
postwar data suggesting that money could be less important in explaining output
fluctuations than has been considered to be.
Theoretical progress as a result of the developments in the economics of information
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and incentives, on the other hand, made it possible to analyze informational asym-
metries and financial market imperfections, which are required to justify the need for
financial intermediation. The inefficiencies in trade due to informational frictions and
institutional devices such as contracts, screening or monitoring needed to structure
incentives in such a way that these inefficiencies are minimized, were among the re-
search topics studied by the economics of information and incentives. As the tools and
techniques necessary to analyze imperfect financial markets were developed, macroe-
conomists started to pay attention to that part of the financial system other than
money as well.
Among the recent literature on the interaction between financial markets and aggre-
gate economic activity, the studies by Sutherland (1996), Senay (1998), and Buch et
al. (2005) are similar in spirit to the chapters of this thesis in terms of their motiva-
tion. These studies investigated the business cycle implications of financial integration
in the case of certain exogenous shocks. They all modeled, in an intertemporal gen-
eral equilibrium framework, the process of financial integration as the elimination of
trading frictions between financial markets in different countries. The model economy
employed in these studies consisted of households, firms and government. Financial in-
tegration was captured through introduction of adjustment costs that households had
to face while transferring funds from domestic bond market to foreign bond market.
Reduction in these costs implied increasing financial integration. Sutherland (1996)
analyzed three asymmetric shocks; namely, money supply, government purchases and
labor supply shocks in terms of their impact on the economy under increasing finan-
cial integration. He showed that increasing financial market integration increased the
volatility of a number of variables such as nominal exchange rate and output when
shocks originated from the money market, but decreased the volatility of most vari-
ables when shocks originated from real demand or supply. Senay (1998) investigated
how increasing financial and goods market integration changed the effectiveness of
fiscal and monetary policies. She found that increasing financial integration increased
the effectiveness of monetary policy while it decreased that of fiscal policy. In ad-
dition, she showed that the effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal policies rose in
response to goods market integration. She attributed that to the greater role of ex-
penditure switching effects in the case of greater goods markets integration. Finally,
Buch et al. (2005) developed a theoretical model based on that by Sutherland to
derive empirically testable hypotheses on how financial market integration might in-
fluence the impact of macroeconomic shocks on business cycle volatility. They showed
that the link between financial openness and business cycle volatility depended on the
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nature of the underlying shock. More specifically, they found that increasing finan-
cial openness magnified output volatility in the presence of monetary, productivity
and risk premium shocks. Moreover, they provided empirical evidence for the fact
that the impact of interest rate volatility on output volatility was enhanced under
increasing financial openness while the impact of government spending volatility was
diminished. They interpreted this finding as increasing monetary policy effectiveness
and decreasing fiscal policy effectiveness in the case of financially integrated markets.
This thesis concentrates on one particular aspect of the financial markets; namely,
financial integration. More specifically, the business cycle implications of increasing
financial integration, captured here as decreasing financial frictions, are investigated
for small open economies. Aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms under
increasing financial integration are analyzed in the case of monetary, technology, and
risk premium shocks for small open economies. Dynamic, stochastic, general equilib-
rium (DSGE, henceforth) frameworks with financial and informational frictions are
developed and employed in order to examine how the response of a small open econ-
omy to exogenous shocks is affected by varying degrees of financial integration. In
the first chapter of the thesis, a real, small open economy framework is set to explore
the influence of increasing financial integration on the economy in the case of tempo-
rary technology shocks. The model economy consists of households, firms, financial
intermediaries and foreign lenders. Abstraction from money both makes it possible
to concentrate on the real implications of financial integration for the business cycle
and makes the setup comparable to those in the standard RBC literature. The second
chapter of the thesis is an extension of the first chapter in such a way that money
is incorporated into the model economy. A major novelty of this chapter is that it
combines two strands of literature: the cash-in-advance (CIA, henceforth) and the
collateralized borrowing. Through introduction of a central bank that is responsible
for the monetary injection into the economy, the framework is enriched such that
money growth shocks as well as technology shocks can be analyzed under increasing
financial integration. Finally, in the third chapter of the thesis, government sector is
integrated into the model in order to allow for fiscal policy and risk premium anal-
yses. To be more specific, a government subject to endogenous default risk while
borrowing is introduced into the economy such that shocks to the risk premium it has
to pay to the lenders in order to compensate for the risk of default can be investigated.
The term ”business cycle” refers to aggregate fluctuations in economic activity or pro-
duction over periods of months or years. These fluctuations occur around a long-term
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growth trend and usually include shifts between periods of relatively rapid economic
growth; namely, expansion, and periods of relative stagnation; namely, contraction.
Fluctuations are often measured using the growth rate of real output. Historically,
short-term fluctuations were attributed to external factors, such as war, rather than
to business cycles by the economists, who studied mainly the long term. Starting
with the Panic of 1825, which was the first notable internal economic crisis occuring
in peacetime, attention was devoted to analyses of economic cycles. In 1860, French
economist Clement Juglar identified the average duration of business cycles as 8 to 11
years. Later in the mid-20th century, Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter specified
the four stages of Juglar cycles: expansion, crisis, recession and recovery. Schumpeter
associated recovery and expansion with aggregate demand, consumer confidence and
productivity. In 1946, Burns and Mitchell made a now standard definition of business
cycles as ”a type of fluctuation in the aggregate economic activity of nations that or-
ganize their work mainly in business enterprises”. They claimed that cycles consist of
expansions occuring simultaneously in many economic activities, followed by similarly
general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the expansion phase
of the next cycle.
The RBC theory, initiated mainly by the pioneering study by Kydland and Prescott
(1982), is the school of thought in the business cycle literature that suggests ran-
dom fluctuations in productivity to be the basic determinant of business cycles. The
random fluctuations in the productivity level, i.e., technology shocks, are asserted to
shift the constant growth trend of an economy up or down through directly changing
the effectiveness of capital and/or labor. The change in the productivity of factors
of production affects the behavior of the agents in the economy, leading to changes
in the levels of consumption and production, and eventually output. In contrast to
the other theories of the business cycle, RBC theory sees recessions and expansions
as the efficient response of the economy to exogenous shocks. Therefore, the need
for government intervention is rejected by RBC theorists, who do not regard business
cycles as the failure of markets to clear, as the Keynesians or the Monetarists do. Ac-
cording to the RBC theory, the issue is one of efficient fluctuation, not of elimination
of business cycles through economic policy.
There are also economists, who take a stand between the RBC theorists and the
government interventionists in that they advocate both the necessity of government
policies and the importance of uncovering the relative contribution of different sources
of economic fluctuations. Aiyagari (1994) discusses that the choice of a policy instru-
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ment can depend on the relative impact of different shocks on fluctuations. He argues
that, sometimes, the exact nature of a desirable policy rule can be dependent on the
nature of the shock.3 More specifically, the way government policy variables should
respond to observable variables such as output, consumption, investment etc. might
depend on the exact source of the fluctuations. In the case of uncertainty regarding
the sources of the fluctuations, governments might have to develop signal extraction
mechanisms in order to be able to design optimal policies. Such mechanisms would
in turn depend on the relative contribution of possible sources of fluctuations to the
observables.
The business cycle statistics for the U.S. economy that are attempted to be predicted
correctly by the RBC models involve volatility, persistence, and cyclicality of the basic
macroeconomic variables. As far as volatility is concerned, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that consumption, wages, labor productivity, capital stock, total factor produc-
tivity (TFP, henceforth) and government expenditures are less volatile than output;
whereas investment and capital utilization are more volatile than output. According
to the data regarding employment, total hours worked and employment are almost as
volatile as output, while hours per worker is much less volatile than output. The U.S.
data exhibits strong procyclicality of consumption, investment, total hours worked,
labor productivity and TFP. Wages, capital stock and government expenditures turn
out to be acyclical; whereas real interest rate data shows countercyclicality. Regarding
persistence, first-order autocorrelations are high and positive for all macroeconomic
aggregates. The high serial correlation is the reason why there is some predictability
to the business cycle.4
As both the theoretical and the empirical literature using the RBC approach grew,
the methods of the RBC research program were started to be applied in international
economics, monetary economics, public finance, labor economics, asset pricing and
so on. In contrast to previous studies, many of these new model economies included
market imperfections, making government intervention not only desirable, but also
3For an analysis on macroeconomic policies and business cycles in emerging economies, see Lane
(2003).
4Backus et al. (1992) provide an extension of the RBC theory to open economies through analyz-
ing whether a two-country RBC model can account simultaneously for domestic and international
aspects of business cycles. More specifically, they question whether the RBC theory can account for
both the comovements studied in closed-economy macroeconomics and international comovements
such as correlations across countries of fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates and movements in
the balance of trade.
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necessary. In others, business cycles were driven by the shocks to the monetary sec-
tor. DSGE models were established as the frameworks to conduct macroeconomic
analyses. The DSGE methodology and literature are discussed in detail below.
The RBC theory has been criticized on several different grounds. One major criti-
cism, namely, that it neglects the impact of monetary policy on business cycles, is
due to the fact that economic fluctuations are modeled in a nonmonetary framework.
Moreover, many researchers argue that it downplays the role of market inefficiencies
and minimizes the importance of unemployment. Furthermore, statistics such as the
correlation between wage rate and output, the correlation between wage rate and la-
bor supply, and the labor supply elasticity turn out to be much higher in the standard
RBC model than in the data. Last but not least, it has been claimed that the RBC
models require shocks of unrealistic magnitudes and volatility to be able to match
the empirical evidence. More specifically, the standard RBC model assumes large and
volatile productivity shocks, i.e., considerable variability in productivity, to be able
to explain the fluctuations seen in the data.
The last criticism mentioned above, that RBC models require large and persistent pro-
ductivity shocks to be able to explain business cycle fluctuations, led to the birth of a
new research area within the RBC theory: the amplification/propagation mechanisms
in the RBC framework. In order for simulated time paths of output, consumption,
investment and labor input to be consistent with actual U.S. business cycles, mech-
anisms through which small productivity shocks can be amplified were searched by
researchers. In other words, the idea was to find processes that generate empirically
reasonable business cycles out of reasonably small productivity shocks. In order to
do that, several different modifications of the standard RBC model were undertaken,
including unobserved factor variation and capacity utilization. The modified RBC
model with the assumptions of indivisible labor and costly variation in capital utiliza-
tion turned out to better mimic actual U.S. business cycles than the standard RBC
model. Through amplification mechanisms, variable capital utilization and a highly
elastic labor supply caused small changes in productivity to have substantial effects on
macroeconomic activity. The basic neoclassical growth model, however, does not pro-
duce substantial internal propagation of temporary productivity shocks in the sense
that there is no tendency for the economy to exhibit a period of high output and
work effort followed by another period with similarly high output in response to a
one-time, positive productivity shock. The effects of the one-time shock in period 1
are propagated over time; the large investment in period 1 leads to high values of the
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capital stock that keep output above its steady-state level in the following periods.
However, this propagation mechanism is rather weak.
Kydland and Prescott also developed ”quantitative theory” as an alternative to tra-
ditional methods of analyzing data in economics. The idea was that any good model
should also generate business cycles that quantitatively match the stylized facts in
the data, in addition to qualitatively explaining key business cycle regularities. This
approach, also known as ”calibration”, aims to formulate theoretical models in terms
of parameters that can be measured relatively easily. It is based on the idea of es-
timating parameters from data different than the data to be explained. In practice,
one of the major focuses is to reconcile long-run time series behavior (growth) with
short-run behavior (business cycles). As the seminal 1982 paper was written by Kyd-
land and Prescott, the foundation of dynamic macroeconomics had already been laid,
and the next goal was to understand how to use the theory to study quantitative
fluctuations. Kydland and Prescott developed practical methods in order to be able
to draw inferences about the implications of the growth theory for quantitative fluc-
tuations. The insistence on explaining quantitative features of the data as well as the
qualitative ones has changed the focus of the macroeconomic research from qualitative
to quantitative analysis.
As stated above, the models developed and analyzed in the chapters of this thesis are
DSGE models. DSGE models constitute a branch of general equilibrium theory that
attempts to explain aggregate economic phenomena such as economic growth, business
cycles, effects of monetary and fiscal policies, on the basis of macroeconomic models
derived from microeconomic principles. As the name, DSGE, suggests, macroeco-
nomic behavior is derived in these models from the interaction of the decisions of all
the agents in the economy, acting over time, in the face of uncertainty about future
conditions. More specifically, DSGE models are dynamic; studying how the economy
evolves over time, stochastic; taking into account the fact that the economy is affected
by random shocks such as technological change, general equilibrium models; seeking
to explain the behavior of supply, demand and prices through considering all markets
in an economy simultaneously.5
DSGE models have been employed extensively in the literature, especially over the
last decade, in order to analyze business cycles, aggregate fluctuations and propa-
5Woodford (2003) provides an elaborate survey of the DSGE modeling.
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gation mechanisms. Smets and Wouters (2007) estimated a DSGE model for the
US economy using seven macroeconomic time series. They employed a model that
incorporates many types of real and nominal frictions and seven types of structural
shocks. They investigated empirically the relative importance of the various frictions
using a Bayesian likelihood approach. The authors showed that their model was able
to compete with Bayesian Vector Autoregression models in out-of-sample prediction.
They also addressed, using the estimated model, some of the key issues in the business
cycle analysis such as the sources of business cycle fluctuations, the cross correlation
between output and inflation, and the effects of productivity on hours worked. Kim
(2003) examined the basic features of business cycles under exogenous and endoge-
nous monetary policy rules in DSGE models with nominal rigidities. The calibration
experiments showed that business cycles featured differences depending on whether
the monetary policy rules were exogenous or endogenous, and that these differences
were as large as those generated by nominal rigidities and monetary disturbances.
Kim argued, therefore, that developing a proper way to incorporate endogenous mon-
etary policy rules might be as important as developing new transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy disturbances.
In an earlier paper, Smets and Wouters (2003) developed and estimated a DSGE
model with sticky prices and wages for the euro area. Using a model incorporating
habit formation, costs of adjustment in capital accumulation and variable capacity
utilization, they analyzed the effects of ten orthogonal structural shocks including
productivity, labor supply, investment and monetary policy shocks on the business
cycle fluctuations in the euro area. In a followup study, Smets and Wouters (2005)
estimated a DSGE model with many types of shocks and frictions for both the US
and the euro area economy in order to compare the business cycle characteristics of
the two economies. The structural Bayesian estimation procedure they employed al-
lowed them to investigate whether the differences in business cycle behavior were due
to the differences in the types of shocks that hit those economies, the differences in
the propagation mechanisms of those shocks or the differences in the ways the central
banks responded to those shocks. They concluded that each of these characteristics
was similar across the two currency areas.
As mentioned earlier, the models developed and analyzed in the second and in the
third chapters of this thesis involve money, where money is introduced into the econ-
omy through CIA constraints. CIA modelling is not the only way to incorporate
money into real frameworks, yet it has several advantages that are worth mentioning.
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The neoclassical growth model, pioneered by Ramsey (1928) and Solow (1956), con-
stitutes the basic framework for much of modern macroeconomics. Solow’s growth
model shows that, under certain assumptions, an economy converges to a steady-state
growth path along which output, capital stock and effective labor supply all grow at
the same rate. One of these key assumptions is that the capital accumulation process
is defined in such a way that a fixed fraction of output is devoted to investment each
period. When this assumption of a fixed savings rate is relaxed and the economy con-
sists of forward-looking households choosing the amount of savings and labor supply
to maximize lifetime utility, the Solow model lays out the basic framework for ana-
lyzing business cycles with the use of dynamic stochastic models. Real disturbances
such as productivity shocks affect output and savings, with the resulting capital ac-
cumulation propagating the impact of the initial shock on the economy in ways that
are similar to some empirical features of the business cycles.
The neoclassical growth model is a real economy model without any sort of medium of
exchange, i.e., money, to be used for the transactions taking place in the economy. In
this nonmonetary economy, goods are exchanged with each other. In order to be able
to examine monetary issues within the framework of the neoclassical growth model,
money has to be attributed a role in the economy so that agents would like to hold
positive quantities of money. In other words, there should be some mechanism that
creates positive demand for money in the economy. There have been three approaches
in the literature to incorporate money into general equilibrium models: 1. assuming
that money yields direct utility to the agents in the model through having money
embodied in the utility functions of the agents (Sidrauski (1967)); 2. imposing some
forms of transaction costs that create demand for money; 3. treating money like any
other asset that is used to transfer resources intertemporally (Samuelson (1958)). The
first approach refers to the so-called ”money-in-the-utility function” methodology, in
which agents’ utilities depend directly on their consumption of goods and their hold-
ings of money. Regarding the second approach, there are several possibilities such as
making asset exchanges costly (Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956)), requiring that money is
used for certain types of transactions (Clower (1967)), assuming that time and money
can be combined to create transaction services that are necessary for obtaining con-
sumption goods, or assuming that direct exchange of commodities is costly (Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989)). The cash-in-advance (CIA, henceforth) modeling employs this
second approach, requiring that money balances are held to finance certain types of
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purchases.6
The money-in-the-utility (MIU) approach has been criticized for solving the problem
of creating positive value for money by simply assuming the problem away; that is,
assuming that money yields direct utility and thereby guaranteeing that money will
be valued. In other words, there is a clearly defined reason for individuals to hold
money in the MIU model; namely, the direct utility it yields. However, this essentially
solves the problem of generating a positive demand for money by assumption; it does
not address the reason why money might yield utility. Yet money is usually thought of
as yielding utility through use; i.e., money facilitates transactions. Money serves as a
medium of exchange that yields indirect utility through reducing costs of transactions
or allowing certain purchases to be made. The demand for money is then determined
by the nature of the transactions technology in the economy.
The CIA approach requires that money balances be held to finance certain types of
purchases. CIA models assume that money has unique properties, unlike other fi-
nancial assets, that allow it to be used to facilitate transactions. The CIA approach,
proposed by Clower (1967) and developed by Lucas (1980a) and Grandmont and
Younes (1972), captures the role of money as a medium of exchange by requiring
explicitly that money be used to purchase consumption goods. According to the
specification of the CIA models, individuals are assumed to face, in addition to a
standart budget constraint, a CIA constraint, the exact form of which depends on
the transactions or purchases that are subject to the CIA requirements. The timing
assumptions regarding the order in which the markets in the model economy open
are also important in CIA models. Agents determine their cash balances and relative
asset holdings depending on when the asset and the goods markets open. The DSGE
models developed and analyzed in the second and in the third chapters of this thesis
employ CIA constraints, through which money is incorporated into the real framework
of the first chapter.
In the first chapter of this thesis, aggregate fluctuations and propagation mecha-
nisms under varying degrees of financial openness are analyzed for a real, small open
economy. Using a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial
intermediation and foreign borrowing, the implications of increasing financial open-
ness for the impact of temporary technology shocks on the economy are investigated.
6Walsh (2003) provides exhaustive information about CIA modeling.
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Informational asymmetries among the agents in the economy and Holmstrom-Tirole
type of uncertainty in the production process necessitate financial intermediation and
collateralized borrowing in the economy. The simulation experiments with different
levels of financial openness reveal that increasing financial openness amplifies the im-
pact of positive, temporary technology shocks on output, investment, consumption,
labor supply and net exports. This is mainly due to the fact that the promoting
effect of a positive technology shock on the economy is coupled with the improving
impact of increasing financial openness on output led by increasing access to cheaper
foreign funds. The model confirms the findings of the real business cycle literature
on small open economies and the empirical regularities typical of open economies in
terms of the procyclicality of investment and labor supply and the countercyclicality
of external trade. In addition, there is a positive correlation between savings and
investment, which is in line with the empirical evidence pointed out in the business
cycle literature for small open economies under imperfect capital mobility.
The second chapter of this thesis examines the business cycle implications of increas-
ing financial integration for a small open economy. Extending the dynamic, stochastic,
general equilibrium framework with financial and informational frictions in Chapter 1
in such a way as to incorporate money into the economy, the impact of money growth
and technology shocks on the aggregate economic activity is investigated under vary-
ing degrees of financial integration. Financial frictions in the model are in the form of
restrictions on the composition of deposits held by the financial intermediaries in the
economy. More specifically, financial intermediaries are assumed to be able to hold no
more than a certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. An increase
in this fraction implies decreasing financial frictions that is interpreted as increasing
financial integration here. A major novelty of this chapter is that it combines two
strands of literature: the CIA and the collateralized borrowing. The small open econ-
omy DSGE model developed in the second chapter of this thesis predicts an expansion
in output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans in response to a positive,
temporary monetary shock; whereas a positive, temporary technology shock leads to
an increase in output, investment, domestic deposits, loans, labor demand and net
exports, and a decrease in consumption. The simulation experiments with different
levels of financial integration reveal that increasing financial integration amplifies the
impact of temporary monetary shocks on output, consumption, investment, labor de-
mand and loans. The amplification effect of increasing financial integration is due to
the mechanism in which the output-promoting impact of positive monetary injection
is coupled with increasing access to cheaper foreign funds that enhance production
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through leading to a rise in the loanable funds available for firms. The increase in the
amount of funds available for firms due to a positive monetary injection leads to a
rise in the amount of loans actually given to the firms through a fall in the loan rate,
which is stimulated further by increasing financial integration that raises the volume
of cheaper foreign funds held by financial intermediaries. The effect of increasing fi-
nancial integration in the case of temporary technology shocks is found to be rather
negligible. The sensitivity analyses undertaken reveal that our results regarding the
impact of temporary monetary and technology shocks on a small open economy are
robust.
Finally, in the third chapter of this thesis, risk premium shocks are investigated in
terms of their implications for aggregate fluctuations in a small open economy. A
government sector that borrows domestically with an endogenous partial default risk
is incorporated into the dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework in Chap-
ter 2. The risk premium arises in the model due to the default risk, for which the
domestic lenders, that also have the option of holding foreign securities, must be com-
pensated by the government. A risk premium shock, therefore, affects the investment
decisions of households in terms of relative asset holdings. It also has implications for
government spending, which is supposed to be financed through domestic borrowing
and taxation. In response to a positive, temporary risk premium shock, the model
developed in Chapter 3 predicts an increase in the interest rate on government bonds
and in the nominal exchange rate. The depreciation in the exchange rate increases
the value of the government bonds in terms of the domestic currency, which leads to a
rise in the tax rate due to the simple tax rule followed by the government. Determined
partly by the size of the exchange rate depreciation and partly by the tax adjustment
parameter, the increase in the amount of the tax revenue of the government, accompa-
nied by a decrease in the government borrowing due to higher costs of repayment for
the government, leads to an increase in the government spending. In response to the
rise in the price level, households reduce their consumption. Domestic deposit hold-
ings by households, on the other hand, increase since the supply of government bonds
is lower. As deposits rise, so do total loans available for firms. However, the increase
in the amount of loans does not consequently lead to an increase in employment, and
subsequently in production, due to the rise in the distorting tax rate creating disin-
centives to work and thereby causing a fall in the labor supply. Therefore, output
also falls in response to the positive risk premium shock.
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Chapter 1
Technology Shocks Under Varying
Degrees of Financial Openness
1.1 Introduction
The influences of international trade, both in goods and capital, and technology im-
provements on the business cycles of countries have long been issues of debate and
increasingly attractive areas of research in the literature. Analyzing the impact of
technological progress on an economy under varying degrees of openness might allow
one to draw insights into policy and business cycle implications of varying levels of
integration with the rest of the world, which could be crucial especially for emerg-
ing economies that are still in the process of liberalizing their capital and current
accounts. With this motivation, financial openness is being focused in this chapter of
the thesis in terms of its implications for the effect of temporary technology shocks
on a small open economy.
In this chapter, aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms under increas-
ing financial openness are investigated in the case of technology shocks for a real,
small open economy.1 A dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with
households, firms, financial intermediaries, foreign lenders and a financial regulator is
developed. The existence of financial and informational frictions and uncertainty in
the model necessitate financial intermediation in the economy. The uncertainty in the
1For more details on output dynamics and propagation mechanisms in real business cycle models,
see Nason and Cogley (1995). A comprehensive analysis of aggregate fluctuations in the case of
financial frictions is provided by von Hagen and Zhang (2008b).
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production process also leads to collateralized borrowing by the firms, with physical
capital stock used as collateral. There is abstraction from money in the setup of the
framework in order to be able to concentrate on the real implications of increasing
financial openness for the economy in the case of technology shocks. It is shown that
increasing financial openness amplifies the impact of a temporary, positive technology
shock on output, investment, consumption, labor supply and net exports; whereas it
diminishes that on domestic savings.
Discussions regarding the contribution of technology shocks to business cycles have
been controversial since the pioneering work by Kydland and Prescott (1982).2 Using
a modified equilibrium growth model with non-time-separable utility function and
the assumption that more than one time period is required for the construction of
new productive capital, Kydland and Prescott explained the cyclical variances of a
set of economic time series, the covariances between real output and the other series,
and the autocovariance of output. In the much-cited paper leading this line of re-
search, Prescott (1986) argued that technology shocks account for more than half of
the fluctuations in real output in the post-war period. Since then, many economists
have attempted to refine the estimate of Prescott as well as to uncover the impact
of technology shocks on aggregate fluctuations by looking at more elaborate dynamic
general equilibrium models.3 It has also been argued that the contribution of technol-
ogy shocks to aggregate fluctuations depends on several factors including the extent
of imperfect competition, external economies of scale, overtime wage premiums and
measurement errors in labor input and output, as also pointed out by Aiyagari (1994).
Consequently, in order to be able to determine the exact contribution of technology
shocks to business cycles, precise quantitative measures of these factors would be
required.4 In this chapter, the main objective is to analyze the implications of tech-
nology shocks for business cycle fluctuations taking into account the potential impact
of degree of financial openness.
There are imperfections in the economy examined in this chapter in the form of
2For a comprehensive analysis of real business cycles in general, see King and Rebelo (1999) and
McCandless (2008).
3See, among others, Gali (1999), Gali (2004) and Baxter (1995).
4The dynamic effects of technology shocks have also been investigated through taking into account
the distinction between neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Neutral technology shocks
affect the production of all goods homogeneously, whereas investment-specific shocks affect only
investment goods. Among others, see Fisher (2006) and Basu et al. (2006). For an in-depth analysis
of the long-run implications of investment-specific technological change, see Greenwood et al. (1997).
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Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type of uncertainty in the production process, financial fric-
tions restricting the amount of foreign borrowing, and informational asymmetries
among the agents in the economy. Entrepreneurs that run the firms can choose be-
tween two different projects for production, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic
risk. The projects yield positive output in the case of success and no output in the
case of failure. The projects differ according to their probabilities of success and the
private benefits they provide to the entrepreneurs. It is those private benefits that
create incentives for the managers of the firms, inducing them to act against the
interest of their creditors. The project choices of the entrepreneurs are private infor-
mation, whereas the project outcomes are verifiable by the financial intermediaries.
Households and foreign investors are assumed to lack the ability to verify the project
outcomes. Therefore, domestic and foreign investors prefer lending to firms indirectly,
through financial intermediaries, rather than directly.
Financial openness has become an increasingly attractive topic in both theoretical
and empirical literature over the last couple of decades. This is partly because of
its interaction with macroeconomic fundamentals, and partly due to its contradictory
consequences, especially for emerging economies. On the one hand, it provides emerg-
ing economies with the funds that might be used to realize investment opportunities.
On the other hand, it exposes them to increasing financial vulnerability against ex-
ternal shocks since the financial infrastructure in such economies is not adequately
developed. Financial openness can be interpreted as the status of the financial mar-
kets determining the degree of financial integration with the rest of the world, which
might in turn depend on the financial frictions that prevent capital from freely flowing
across international borders.5 The impact of financial openness on economic growth,
macroeconomic volatility, the effectiveness of government policy rules depends on
many factors including the structure of the financial system, the quality of financial
supervision and regulation, the soundness of financial institutions, and the rapidity
of the integration process.6
Financial openness is incorporated into the model through the introduction of a reg-
5”Financial openness” and ”financial integration” are used interchangeably throughout this thesis,
having mentioned the relationship between the two.
6See, among others, Arteta et al. (2003), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Chinn and Ito (2006),
and Alper and Cakici (2009). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) argue that also the degree of financial
integration depends on factors such as financial infrastructure, financial innovation, sectoral trends
like securitization that exhibit differences across advanced economies and emerging markets.
17
ulation in the economy that the financial intermediaries can hold no more than a
certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. This fraction, higher levels
of which imply higher degrees of financial openness, is assumed to be controlled by
the financial regulator in the economy.
Analyzing technology shocks under varying degrees of financial openness for a small
open economy might allow one to draw insights into the implications of increasing
financial openness for the business cycles in emerging economies, which are still in
the process of liberalizing their financial as well as current accounts. The rest of the
chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents the model and the system of
equations obtained as the solution of the model. The results regarding the simulation
of the model, the impulse response functions and the sensitivity analyses are given in
section 1.3. Finally, section 1.4 presents the concluding remarks.
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1.2 The Model
The model developed here is a real, small open economy model incorporating finan-
cial and informational frictions as well as uncertainty in the production process. The
economy consists of households, firms, financial intermediaries, foreign lenders and a
financial regulator. Abstracting from money in the framework helps to concentrate on
the real implications of varying degrees of financial openness for the impact of tech-
nology shocks on the economy. All decisions are made after, and therefore completely
reflect, the current period surprise change in technology. For the timing of the stock
variables, like the capital stock, ”stock as of the end of the period” convention is used.
For instance, Kt denotes the capital stock at the end of period t.
Infinitely lived households, that are assumed to be the owners of the financial interme-
diaries, maximize their utility functions that depend on consumption, Ct, and hours
worked, Ht. They decide how much to deposit at the financial intermediaries, DDt,
how much to consume, and how much labor to supply to the firms. At the beginning
of each period, households receive their previous period deposits plus the interest
payment and make current period deposits at the financial intermediaries. They also
supply labor, earn wage income and decide how much consumption to make. There
is no bond market in the economy, therefore there are no bond holdings of households.
Firms are owned by entrepreneurs, who have a finite but stochastic lifetime. Every
period, a certain mass of entrepreneurs receives a signal of death and leaves the econ-
omy, whereas new entrepreneurs of equal mass enter the economy next period. In
the aggregate, the share of entrepreneurs in the society is constant. Entrepreneurs
maximize profits, Ft, by choosing next period’s capital stock, Kt, labor demand, Nt,
and loans, Lt, they borrow from financial intermediaries. At the beginning of every
period, the existing entrepreneurs in the economy pay back the loans they borrowed
in the previous period from the financial intermediaries including the interest and
borrow new loans for the current period. Entrepreneurs then use these loans to hire
labor for production. The new entrants, on the other hand, are assumed to bring
along some initial wealth with which they can buy the capital stock they need for
production from the financial intermediaries. There is Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type
of uncertainty in the production process. Entrepreneurs have two available project
choices to produce the single consumption good7, both of which are subject to idiosyn-
7The consumption good and the capital good are assumed to be identical for analytical purposes.
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cratic risk; namely, they yield positive return in the case of success and zero return
in the case of failure. The projects differ according to their probabilities of success,
with pH in the case of project ”good” and pL in the case of project ”bad”. It is the
private benefits, PB, that project ”bad” yields that create incentives for firm man-
agers to act against the interest of their creditors. Project ”good” yields no private
benefits. It is assumed that the project outcomes can be perfectly verified by the fi-
nancial intermediaries while the project choices of the entrepreneurs are unobservable.
Foreign lenders are assumed to supply funds, FDt, infinitely elastically at a constant
interest rate, R∗, that is lower than the domestic loan rate.
Finally, financial intermediaries (FI henceforth) maximize the expected infinite hori-
zon discounted stream of dividends, Bt, they pay to households. They receive deposits
from households, DDt, and deposits from foreign investors, FDt. The FI then use
these funds to give loans to firms. According to the loan contract between the FI
and the firms, the FI gain a net return of RFt − 1 in the case of success of the firms’
projects and a certain fraction, µ, of the capital stock of the firms in the case of fail-
ure. The FI are allowed to hold no more than a certain fraction of their total deposits
as foreign deposits. In other words, there is an upper limit on the fraction of total
deposits to be held as foreign deposits by the FI. At the beginning of each period,
financial intermediaries receive the loans they lent to firms in the previous period
inclusive of the interest payments, sell the capital stock they have acquired from firms
whose projects failed, and pay back the domestic and foreign deposits they collected
in the previous period together with the interest. Additionally, they accept current
period deposits from households and foreign lenders and give current period loans to
firms.
Financial openness is captured in this model by the parameter ψ that represents the
fraction of foreign deposits over total deposits the FI collect. The parameter, higher
levels of which imply higher degrees of financial openness, is assumed to be controlled
by the financial regulator in the economy.
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1.2.1 Households
A typical infinitely lived household maximizes an expected utility function of the form
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt[(1− φ)lnCt + φln(1−Ht)]
}
, 0 < β, φ < 1 (1.1)
where β is the time discount factor, subject to the budget constraint
Ct = WtHt +DDt−1RH,t−1 −DDt +Bt (1.2)
where Wt represents the real wage rate and Ct denotes the purchase of the single
consumption good that serves as the numeraire. DDt and Bt denote domestic deposits
and dividends from financial intermediaries, respectively. The households’ problem is
also subject to the following nonnegativity constraint
0 ≤ DDt (1.3)
1.2.2 Firms
There is a certain mass of entrepreneurs in the population that runs the firms in the
economy. Each period, pi percent of them dies and an equal mass of new entrants
are added to the population such that the size of the population remains the same.8
At the micro level, this means that, with probability pi, each entrepreneur receives a
signal every period that he will die at the end of the period. Entrepreneurs receiving
this signal consume everything that is left of their wealth at the end of the period
8This assumption is needed in order to be able to prevent the entrepreneurs from accumulating
too much profits that would invalidate the borrowing constraint of the firms. In the literature, part
of profits accumulated by the firms is, alternatively, distributed to the households, that are assumed
to own the firms, as dividends (see, among others, Feldstein and Green (1983)). However, in the
current context, there are informational asymmetries in the sense that households are not able to
observe firms’ profits. Therefore, the assumption that firms are owned by households and that they
distribute part of their profits to households as dividends is not reasonable here.
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after paying back their debts. The new entrants bring along some initial wealth
with which they can obtain the capital stock they need to start production. They
buy this capital stock from the financial intermediaries, which receive capital stock
as repayment of loans in the case of failure of the firms’ projects. Entrepreneurs,
therefore, maximize profits taking into account this probability of death. There is
uncertainty involved in the production process of the firm, resulting from the fact
that the entrepreneur has two available projects to produce goods, both of which
are subject to idiosyncratic risk. More specifically, the entrepreneur has two project
choices that differ according to their probabilities of success and the private benefits
they provide to the entrepreneur, and there is positive output in the case of success
of the projects while there is no output in the case of failure. pH and pL denote
the probabilities of success of the ”good” and the ”bad” project, respectively, where
0 < pL < pH < 1. The entrepreneur gets PB amount of private benefits per capital
stock if he chooses the project ”bad” whereas there is no private benefit obtained from
the project ”good”. The entrepreneur’s payoffs from the projects can be summarized
as follows:
In the case of ”good project”:
pH [Yt −RFtLt] + (1− pH)[0− µ(1− δ)Kt−1]
In the case of ”bad project”:
pL[Yt −RFtLt] + (1− pL)[0− µ(1− δ)Kt−1] + PBKt
where Lt represents loans that firms borrow from financial intermediaries at a gross
interest rate of RFt. µ is the parameter measuring the fraction of the capital stock
of firms to be handed over to financial intermediaries in the case of failure of the
projects. This is going to be mentioned in more detail below. The entrepreneurs
maximize, every period, the profits, Ft, given as
Ft ≤ pHYt − pHpiRFtLt − pH(1− pi)RF,t−1Lt−1 − (1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1 (1.4)
where δ is the constant physical depreciation rate of capital. Given that the firm
chooses the project ”good” (which will be the case as long as the incentive constraint
stated below holds), with probability pH the firm is able to make use of the loans it
borrows from the FI to hire Nt amount of labor, which it can employ together with the
capital stock it has, Kt−1, to produce Yt amount of output. The entrepreneur makes
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in this case an interest payment to the FI for the loans at the rate specified in the loan
contract, RFt. In the case of failure, there is no output produced and the entrepreneur
has to transfer a certain amount of its capital stock, which it used as collateral in or-
der to be able to borrow from the FI, to the FI. Due to the fact that capital stock
is employed in the production process and therefore subject to depreciation indepen-
dent of the project outcome of the firm, it is the net-of-depreciation amount of capital
stock, the fraction of which is to be handed over to the FI in the case of failure. The
period t loans of the firm, Lt, and the period t wage payments, WtNt, cancel out above.
The production function of the firm is given by
Yt = K
α
t−1(AtNt)
1−α (1.5)
with At denoting technology, the shock process of which is a unit root with drift in
the log of technology, given as
lnAt = γ + lnAt−1 + A,t, A,t ∼ N(0, σ2A) (1.6)
The capital accumulation equation is given as
Kt = p
H [piµ(1−δ)Kt−1+(1−pi)(It+(1−δ)Kt−1)]+(1−pH)(1−µ)(1−δ)Kt−1, 0 < δ < 1
(1.7)
Kt represents the level of physical capital to be employed in the production process
at time t+1, determined by the firm at time t. Equation (1.7) is the capital accu-
mulation equation at the macro level in the sense that pi represents here the mass,
out of a group of entrepreneurs, that dies each period, rather than the probability
of death of a single entrepreneur, as in the micro sense. Therefore, the first term
in the paranthesis on the right-hand side of the equation, piµ(1 − δ)Kt−1, stands for
the capital stock held by the new entrants at the beginning of every period (recall
the assumption that an equal mass, pi, of new entrepreneurs enter the economy each
period so that the total size of the population remains unchanged). The second term
represents the amount of capital stock accumulated by the successful entrepreneurs
continuing to live and produce; the net-of-depreciation amount of capital stock of the
current period, (1− δ)Kt−1, plus the amount of investment, It. Investment is equal to
the real profits made by the successful entrepreneurs in the economy. The last term
on the right-hand side of the equation gives the amount of the capital stock of the
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unsuccessful entrepreneurs that cannot make positive real profits due to the fact that
there is no output in the case of failure of the firms’ projects.
For the capital accumulation process to become more clear, the profit and the capital
accumulation functions can be rewritten from a micro perspective such that the profit
made and the capital stock accumulated are captured separately for the cases of
success and failure of the projects. Let F st and K
s
t (F
f
t and K
f
t ) denote the profit
and the capital stock, respectively, accumulated by a single entrepreneur in the case
of success (failure) of the projects. Then, the profit and the capital stock are given as
Ft = F
s
t p
H + F ft (1− pH) (1.8)
and
Kt = K
s
t p
H(1− pi) +Kft (1− pH) (1.9)
The profits made in the case of success of the projects, which are invested, and there-
fore transferred to the next period, by the entrepreneurs, are given by the following
equation:
F st = Yt − piRFtLt − (1− pi)RF,t−1Lt−1 (1.10)
The corresponding capital stock in the case of success of the projects is, therefore,
given as
Kst = F
s
t + (1− δ)Kt−1 (1.11)
In the case of failure of the firms’ projects, there is no output produced; therefore,
profits are
F ft = −µ(1− δ)Kt−1 (1.12)
whereas the capital stock is given as
Kft = F
f
t + (1− δ)Kt−1 = (1− µ)(1− δ)Kt−1 (1.13)
Plugging equations (1.11) and (1.13) into equation (1.9), the capital accumulation
equation given in equation (1.7) is obtained at the micro level.
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Entrepreneurs’ maximization problem is subject to the constraint reflecting the fact
that the firm finances its wage payments with the loans it borrows from the FI. Hence,
it obeys
WtNt ≤ Lt (1.14)
Finally, there is an incentive constraint for the entrepreneur to choose the project
”good”:
Yt −RFtLt ≥ PBKt
(pH − pL) (1.15)
As long as this constraint holds, the entrepreneur maximizes profits given in equation
(1.4) that is written for the case of project ”good”. The incentive constraint also gives
the borrowing constraint of the firm
RFtLt ≤ Yt − PBKt
(pH − pL) (1.16)
from which the loan demand, Ldt , is obtained:
Ldt =
Yt − PBKt(pH−pL)
RFt
(1.17)
The loan supply, on the other hand, is determined according to the outside options of
the financial intermediaries. More specifically, the financial intermediaries continue to
supply loans to the firms as long as their return on the loans is greater than that on
the alternative options available in the economy. Under the assumption that financial
intermediaries can lend to and borrow from one another as well, this implies that their
return on loans must be greater than the return from depositing at another financial
intermediary; that is,
pHRFt + (1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1
Lt
≥ RHt (1.18)
which constitutes the loan supply, Lst , equation. The loan market equilibrium condi-
tion is obtained through equating the loan supply and the loan demand equations.
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1.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
The FI maximize the expected infinite horizon discounted stream of dividends they
pay to households. They receive deposits from households, DDt, and deposits from
foreign investors, FDt. FI then use these funds to give loans to firms. According to
the loan contract between the FI and the firms, FI gain a net return of RFt − 1 in
the case of success of the firms’ projects and a certain fraction, µ, of the capital stock
of the firms in the case of failure. They are allowed to hold no more than a certain
fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. In other words, there is an upper
limit on the fraction of foreign deposits over total deposits to be held by the FI, which
represents the degree of financial openness in the economy.
The objective of the representative financial intermediary is to maximize the expected
infinite horizon discounted stream of dividends it pays to households:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt+1
Bt
Ct+1
}
(1.19)
subject to first the budget constraint
Bt ≤ [pHpiRFtLt+pH(1−pi)RF,t−1Lt−1+(1−pH)µ(1−δ)Kt−1]−RH,t−1DDt−1−R∗FDt−1
(1.20)
where FDt ≥ 0 is the foreign deposits collected by the FI. The net present value of
future dividends is discounted by the marginal utility of consumption due to the fact
that the FI are owned by households and that an extra unit of dividend is valued by
households to the extent that it enables future consumption. Current period deposit
holdings and loans cancel out in the budget constraint.
The second constraint the FI faces, namely the balance sheet constraint, requires that
the liabilities of the FI are less than or equal to its assets, with deposits as the liabil-
ities and loans as the assets
Dt ≤ Lt (1.21)
where Dt = DDt + FDt and FDt = ψDt, DDt = (1− ψ)Dt.
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ψ represents the financial openness parameter assumed to be controlled by the finan-
cial regulator and varies between 0 and 1. Higher levels of ψ imply higher degrees of
financial openness.
1.2.4 System of Equations
In a stochastic setting, the solution of the model is not a series of numbers that match
a given set of equations, as in a deterministic setting. In a stochastic environment,
the best thing agents can do is to specify a decision, policy or feedback rule for the
future, in other words, their optimal actions contingent on each possible realization of
shocks. Therefore, it is a function satisfying the model’s equilibrium conditions that
is being searched. The system of equations consists of the first-order conditions of the
agents’ optimization problems and the market-clearing conditions of the goods, labor
and credit markets.
The first-order conditions of the household’s optimization problem are:
(1− φ)
Ct
=
φ
Wt(1−Ht) (1.22)
arising from the maximization of the household’s utility function with respect to
consumption, and
βRHt
Wt+1(1−Ht+1) =
1
Wt(1−Ht) (1.23)
arising from the maximization with respect to deposits at the bank.
Combining (1.22) and (1.23) gives
1
Ct
=
βRHt
Ct+1
(1.24)
From the firm’s optimization problem, there is the binding borrowing constraint
RFtLt(p
H − pL) = Yt(pH − pL)− PBKt (1.25)
and the equilibrium condition that the marginal product of labor equals the real wage
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Kαt−1(1− α)(AtNt)−αAt = Wt (1.26)
that are among the equations constituting the solution of the model.
Finally, the maximization problem of the FI yields
pHpiRFtCt+2
(1− ψ) = Ct+1β[RHt +
ψ
(1− ψ)R
∗ − p
H(1− pi)RFt
(1− ψ) ] (1.27)
All markets clear at the equilibrium. The following equations represent equilibrium
in the goods, labor and credit markets, respectively:
Ct + It +NXt = Yt (1.28)
Nt = Ht (1.29)
DDt + FDt = Lt (1.30)
NXt denotes net exports, the return on which is used for the net interest payment on
foreign loans minus the amount of foreign borrowing in a given period. Therefore,
NXt =
ψ
1− ψ [(R
∗ − 1)DDt−1 −DDt] (1.31)
Combining (1.14) and (1.22) with (1.29) gives
(
φ
1− φ)
Ct
1−Nt =
Lt
Nt
(1.32)
which constitutes another equation of the system.
The model, however, needs to be made stationary first so that it can be linearized
around the steady-state and that it returns to the steady-state after a shock.9 The
problem of non-stationarity arises because of having stochastic trend in technology.
9In the case of linearization up to the first order, agents behave as if future shocks were equal to
zero (since their expectation is null), due to certainty equivalence. In the linearization up to second
order, agents make their decisions knowing that the future value of innovations are random but
will have zero mean. This is not the same thing because of Jensen’s inequality. For more detailed
information, see DYNARE User Guide.
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In the absence of shocks, real variables grow with At (except Nt which is stationary
since there is no population growth). Detrending is carried out as follows (where hats
above variables denote stationarity and at = At/At−1):
qˆt = qt/At where qt = [Yt, Ct, It, NXt, Kt, Lt,Wt, DDt].
The stationary system of equations is as follows:
(1− φ)(1−Nt)Wt = φCt (1.33)
βRHtCt = Ct+1at+1 (1.34)
RFtLt(p
H − pL) = Yt(pH − pL)− PBKt (1.35)
Kαt−1(1− α)a−αt N−αt = Wt (1.36)
pHpiRFtCt+2at+2 = Ct+1β[(1− ψ)RHt + ψR∗ − pH(1− pi)RFt] (1.37)
Ct + It +NXt = Yt (1.38)
WtNt = Lt (1.39)
Yt = K
α
t−1a
−α
t N
1−α
t (1.40)
Ktat = p
H [piµ(1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− pi)(Itat + (1− δ)Kt−1)] + (1− pH)(1− µ)(1− δ)Kt−1
(1.41)
NXtat =
ψ
1− ψ [(R
∗ − 1)DDt−1 −DDt−1 +DDtat] (1.42)
DDt = (1− ψ)Lt (1.43)
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Given the equations (1.33)-(1.43) and the shock process (1.6), the expected future
paths of the variables [Yt, Ct, It, NXt, Lt, Nt, DDt, Kt, Wt, RHt, RFt], namely, the
impulse response functions, conditional on a temporary technology shock in period 1
are obtained next.
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1.3 Results
1.3.1 Simulation
The procedure of making the model stationary is followed by linearization and simu-
lation.10 The model is linearized up to first order. In the case of linearization up to
the first order, agents behave as if future shocks were equal to zero (since their ex-
pectation is null), due to certainty equivalence. The second-order linearization of the
model, on the other hand, leads to impulse response functions that are the results of
actual Monte Carlo simulations of future shocks. This is due to the fact that there are
cross terms involving the shocks in second-order linear equations, so that the effects
of the shocks depend on the state of the system when the shocks hit. Therefore, it
is not possible to get algebraic average values of all future shocks and their impact.
What is instead done is to pull future shocks from their distribution and see how the
system is affected by them, and to repeat this procedure several times in order to
obtain an average response.
The perturbation method employed to solve and to simulate the model can be sum-
marized as follows: The solution to the system of equations obtained in the previous
section is a set of equations relating variables in the current period to the past state
of the system and current shocks, that satisfy the original system. These are referred
to as ”the policy functions”. In the linearization up to first order, future shocks enter
the linearized system of equations only with their first moments (which are zero in
expectations); therefore, they drop out when taking expectations of the equations.
This is why certainty equivalence holds in the system linearized up to first order. The
(approximate) policy functions are obtained by first rewriting the system in terms of
past variables, current and future shocks, and then linearizing it around the steady
states. Impulse response functions are then acquired simply through iterating the
policy functions starting from some initial values (given by the steady states).11
For simulations, the following values are assigned to the structural parameters of the
10The linearization and the simulation of the model are carried out using DYNARE, which is a
pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB routines that have been developed to support modern
macro modeling.
11The impulse response functions presented in the next section depict the responses of the variables
in terms of deviations from the steady states.
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model: α=0.32, β=0.99, φ=0.76, δ=0.025, γ=0.003.12 Two parameters are of special
interest, namely, ψ -the parameter measuring the degree of financial openness and R∗
-the gross interest rate on foreign deposits. These parameters are interrelated through
equation (1.37), which relates the interest rate on domestic deposits, the domestic loan
rate and the interest rate on foreign deposits. Due to the fact that degree of financial
openness, captured by ψ, is the main parameter of interest here, those parameters
that are closely linked to ψ might also play crucial roles in the analyses of the impli-
cations of financial openness for the impact of shocks on the economy. Simulations
are run using the following sets of values for those parameters: ψ = [0.1, 0.5, 0.9]
and R∗ = [1.01, 1.001, 1.0001]. The fraction of the capital stock to be handed over
to the financial intermediaries by the firms in the case of failure of the projects, µ,
is set to 0.1. The probability of death of the entrepreneurs, pi, is taken as 0.6. The
probabilities of success of the ”good” and the ”bad” projects, pH and pL, are equal
to 0.8 and 0.1, respectively. Finally, the parameter representing the private benefits
of the entrepreneurs in the case of bad projects, PB, is assigned the value 0.1. In the
next section, the impulse response functions are presented.
12For the parameter values, Mendoza (1991) and Dib (2003) are followed. Dib (2003) employs
quarterly Canadian data for the calibration and the estimation in his small-open-economy DSGE
model.
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1.3.2 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 1.1: Temporary Technology Shock
Figure 1.1 presents the impulse responses of the variables in the model in the case
of a one-time, positive, temporary technology shock in period 1. The model predicts
an expansion in output, investment, labor supply and loans while there is contraction
in consumption and net exports in response to the shock. The procyclical behavior
of investment and labor supply, and the countercyclicality of trade balance are con-
sistent with the findings of the real business cycle literature.13 Furthermore, it can
be seen that households rather save than consume as a result of the shock; therefore,
the positive correlation between savings and investment is in line with the empirical
evidence pointed out by Mendoza (1991) for small open economies under imperfect
capital mobility.
13See, among others, Mendoza (1991).
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Figure 1.2: Temporary Technology Shock Under Varying Degrees of Financial Open-
ness
Figure 1.2 displays the impulse response functions of the variables in the case of a
positive, temporary technology shock under three different levels of financial open-
ness.14 The straight line, the dotted line, and the dashed line represent the cases
with ψ equal to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, respectively. It can be seen that increasing financial
openness amplifies the impact of the positive technology shock on output, investment,
consumption, labor supply, loans and net exports. This is due to the fact that the
promoting effect of a positive technology shock on the economy is coupled with the
improving impact of increasing financial openness on output led by increasing access
to cheaper foreign funds.
14The value of the interest rate on foreign deposits used in the simulations that leads to the impulse
responses presented here is R∗ = 1.01.
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1.3.3 Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, some robustness checks for the results presented in the previous section
are undertaken. In addition to those parameters that are closely linked to the main
parameter of interest; namely, the degree of financial openness, the other parameters
in the model are analyzed in terms of their impact on the simulation results obtained
above. It is done by running simulation experiments with varying values of those
parameters. From equation (1.37), it can be seen that the success probability of
project ”good”, pH , the interest rate on foreign deposits, R∗, and the probability of
death of entrepreneurs, pi, are related to one another and to the degree of financial
openness, ψ. Therefore, simulations are run with different values of those parameters
as well as of the parameter measuring the fraction of the capital stock to be handed
over to the FIs in the case of failure of the firms’ projects, µ. Below are some of those
simulation results that are similar to the results presented in the previous section.
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Figure 1.3: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.1, R∗ = 1.01,
pi = 0.6
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Figure 1.4: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.2, R∗ = 1.01,
pi = 0.6
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Figure 1.5: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.1, R∗ =
1.001, pi = 0.6
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Figure 1.6: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.2, R∗ =
1.001, pi = 0.6
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Figure 1.7: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.2, R∗ =
1.001, pi = 0.5
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Figure 1.8: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.1, R∗ =
1.0001, pi = 0.6
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Figure 1.9: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.2, R∗ =
1.0001, pi = 0.6
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Figure 1.10: Temporary Technology Shock with pH = 0.9, pL = 0.2, µ = 0.2, R∗ =
1.0001, pi = 0.5
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1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter of the thesis, aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms un-
der varying degrees of financial openness are analyzed for a real, small open economy.
Using a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial intermedi-
ation and foreign borrowing, the implications of increasing financial openness for the
impact of temporary technology shocks on the economy are investigated. This chap-
ter contributes to the existing literature through proposing a new theoretical frame-
work to examine financial openness, taking into account informational imperfections
and uncertainty as well as financial frictions. Informational asymmetries among the
agents in the economy and uncertainty in the production process necessitate financial
intermediation in the economy. The Holmstrom-Tirole type of uncertainty in the pro-
duction requires also collateralized borrowing by the firms, with the capital stock of
the firms serving as the collateral as well as the factor of production. The abstraction
from money in the setup of the framework makes it possible to be able to concentrate
on the real implications of increasing financial openness for the impact of technology
shocks, business cycle implications of which have long been discussed in the literature.
The small-open-economy DSGE model developed here is solved and simulated in the
case of one-time, positive, temporary technology shocks. The simulation experiments
with different levels of financial openness reveal that increasing financial openness
amplifies the impact of temporary, positive technology shocks on output, investment,
consumption, labor supply and net exports. This is mainly due to the fact that the
promoting effect of a positive technology shock on the economy is coupled with the
improving impact of increasing financial openness on output led by increasing access
to cheaper foreign funds. The model presented here confirms the findings of the real
business cycle literature on small open economies and the empirical regularities typ-
ical of open economies in terms of the procyclicality of investment and labor supply
and the countercyclicality of external trade. In addition, there is a positive correlation
between savings and investment, which is in line with the empirical evidence pointed
out in the business cycle literature for small open economies under imperfect capital
mobility.
Sensitivity analyses carried out using varying values of the parameters in the model
show that the simulation results obtained in the case of positive, temporary technol-
ogy shocks are robust. Analyzing the impact of monetary shocks, as well as technol-
ogy shocks, on an economy under varying degrees of financial openness might allow
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one to gain insights into the design of optimal monetary policy in the case of vary-
ing levels of financial openness. This might have crucial implications especially for
emerging economies, for most of which the process of financial liberalization has not
yet been completed. Therefore, introducing money into the current framework and
thereby analyzing the policy implications of increasing financial openness for small
open economies might be interesting, and hence, constitutes the motivation of the
next chapter of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Financial Integration and Business
Cycles in a Small Open Economy
2.1 Introduction
The business cycle implications of financial frictions have long been investigated in
the literature.1 This study proposes a theoretical framework to examine aggregate
fluctuations and propagation mechanisms under increasing financial integration (di-
minishing financial frictions) for a small open economy, contributing to the existing
literature through taking into account financial and informational frictions and un-
certainty.2 Financial frictions in the model are in the form of restrictions on the
composition of deposits held by the financial intermediaries in the economy. More
specifically, financial intermediaries are assumed to be able to hold only a certain
fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. An increase in this fraction is
interpreted as increasing financial integration. Informational asymmetries among the
agents in the economy and uncertainty in the production process necessitate financial
intermediation and require special attention to the design of the loan contracts be-
tween borrowers (firms) and lenders (financial intermediaries).
In this chapter of the thesis, a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) frame-
work that incorporates financial integration is developed in order to analyze the sen-
1For a comprehensive survey on the interaction between financial structure and aggregate eco-
nomic activity, see, among others, Gertler (1988).
2For more details on output dynamics and propagation mechanisms in real business cycle models,
see Nason and Cogley (1995). Aggregate fluctuations in the case of financial frictions are analyzed
by Fuerst (1995), Gertler (1995), and von Hagen and Zhang (2008b).
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sitivity of the response of a small open economy to money growth and technology
shocks under varying degrees of financial integration.3 The model developed here is
one of cash in advance (CIA), similar in spirit to that by Nason and Cogley (1994),
modified in such a way that it incorporates financial integration. The economy con-
sists of households, firms, foreign lenders, financial intermediaries, the central bank
and the financial regulator. It is shown that increasing financial integration amplifies
the effect of a monetary shock on output, consumption, investment, labor demand
and loans, while it has barely any implication for the impact of a technological shock
on the economy.
The economy analyzed in this chapter features imperfections of the Holmstrom-Tirole
(1997) type of uncertainty in the production process, financial frictions restricting the
amount of foreign borrowing in the economy, and informational asymmetries among
the agents in the economy. Entrepreneurs that run the firms can choose between two
different projects for production, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk. The
projects yield positive output in the case of success and no output in the case of failure.
The projects differ according to their probabilities of success and the private benefits
they provide to the entrepreneurs. It is those private benefits that create incentives for
the managers of the firms, inducing them to act against the interest of their creditors.
The project choices of the entrepreneurs are private information, whereas the project
outcomes are verifiable by the financial intermediaries. Households and foreign in-
vestors are assumed to lack the ability to verify the project outcomes. Therefore,
domestic and foreign investors prefer lending to firms indirectly, through financial in-
termediaries, rather than directly.
Financial integration has become an increasingly attractive topic in both theoretical
and empirical literature over the last couple of decades. This is partly because of
its interaction with macroeconomic fundamentals, and partly due to its contradictory
consequences, especially for emerging economies. On the one hand, it provides emerg-
ing economies with the funds that might be used to realize investment opportunities.
On the other hand, it exposes them to increasing financial vulnerability against ex-
ternal shocks since the financial infrastructure in such economies is not adequately
developed. Financial integration can be interpreted as the process resulting from the
reduction in financial frictions that prevent capital from freely flowing across inter-
3For analyses of transmission mechanisms in the case of monetary shocks in general equilibrium
models, see, among others, Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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national borders. The impact of financial integration on economic growth, macroeco-
nomic volatility, the effectiveness of government policy rules depends on many factors
including the structure of the financial system, the quality of financial supervision and
regulation, the soundness of financial institutions, and the rapidity of the integration
process.
Financial integration is incorporated into the model through the introduction of a
regulation in the economy that the financial intermediaries can hold only a certain
fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. The parameter representing this
fraction is assumed to be controlled by the financial regulator in the economy. This
chapter aims to uncover the changes in the fluctuations in a small open economy in
response to one-time, temporary technology and money growth shocks, if there are
any, under varying degrees of financial integration. In other words, whether the de-
gree of financial integration plays a role at all in the performance of the economy in
response to technology and money growth shocks is investigated.
The empirical literature on the issue of financial liberalization has rather ambiguous
findings regarding the impact of increasing financial openness on the economic per-
formance of countries.4 Arteta et al. (2003) point out the high sensitivity of the
issue of financial integration to the context, the framework in which it is analyzed,
as far as its implications for countries are concerned. The authors find evidence for a
positive association between financial liberalization and economic growth only under
certain conditions; namely, OLS estimation with Quinn’s (1997) measure of finan-
cial openness. In a more recent study, Kose et al. (2006) emphasize the fact that
there is still little robust evidence for growth benefits of broad financial liberalization,
but that equity market liberalizations are shown to significantly boost growth. Fur-
thermore, it is argued that the indirect effects of financial globalization on financial
sector development, institutions, governance and macroeconomic stability are likely
to be more crucial than direct effects through capital accumulation or portfolio di-
versification. In a follow-up paper, Kose et al. (2009) argue that there are certain
”threshold” levels of financial and institutional development that an economy needs
to attain in order to be able to enjoy the benefits from financial liberalization.5 Alper
4See Henry (2007) for a general discussion regarding the effects of financial liberalization on the
real economy and the robustness of these effects.
5Mishkin (2007) both examines the relationship between financial development and economic
growth and analyses whether financial globalization can help encourage financial and economic de-
velopment.
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and Cakici (2009) analyze the impact of increasing financial liberalization on economic
growth using a panel dataset of 75 countries covering the period 1980-2003. Authors
show that financial liberalization has significantly positive effect on economic growth
only when it is accompanied by fiscal prudence, which is proxied by overall budget
balance. Sensitivity of financial integration as a topic to context and methodology
creates room for research and contribution to the literature in the form of providing
new frameworks to investigate it, which constitutes also the motivation of this chapter.
Among the theoretical studies on financial integration, Sutherland (1996), Senay
(1998) and Buch et al. (2005) are similar to the study in this chapter in terms of
their motivation to analyze financial integration; namely, to investigate the business
cycle implications of financial integration in the presence of certain shocks. Sutherland
(1996) models the process of financial integration in an intertemporal general equi-
librium framework as the elimination of trading frictions between financial markets
in different countries. Sutherland shows that increasing financial market integration
increases the volatility of a number of variables when shocks originate from the money
market, but decreases the volatility of most variables when shocks originate from real
demand or supply. The author suggests that the results could change in response to
relaxing the assumption of perfect goods market integration. Senay (1998) investi-
gates how increasing financial and goods market integration changes the effectiveness
of fiscal and monetary policy. Senay analyzes expansionary monetary and fiscal poli-
cies under different degrees of goods and financial market integration in a dynamic
general equilibrium framework. Senay finds that increasing financial integration in-
creases the effectiveness of monetary policy while it decreases that of fiscal policy.
It is argued by the author that these effects arise through the interaction between
relative asset returns and the exchange rate. Buch et al. (2005) develop a theoretical
model based on that by Sutherland to derive empirically testable hypotheses on how
financial market integration might influence the impact of macroeconomic shocks on
business cycle volatility. They show that the link between financial openness and busi-
ness cycle volatility depends on the nature of the underlying shock. More specifically,
they find that increasing financial openness magnifies output volatility in the presence
of monetary, productivity and risk premium shocks. The model economy employed in
these studies consists of households, firms and government. Financial integration is
captured through introduction of adjustment costs that households have to face while
transferring funds from domestic bond market to foreign bond market. Reduction in
these costs implies increasing financial integration. The novelty of this chapter of the
thesis is the provision of a framework incorporating also financial intermediation for
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the analysis of financial integration, which is then used to analyze the response of the
economy to money growth and technology shocks under varying degrees of financial
integration. Financial integration is captured here as the fraction of total deposits
financial intermediaries hold as foreign deposits.
As far as models with financial intermediation are concerned, there is a literature
following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) designing the loan contracts between borrowers
and lenders with some durable asset, like land, as collateral.6 In these models, lenders
cannot force borrowers to repay debts unless those debts are secured. In such a con-
text, borrowers’ assets like land serve both as factors of production and as collateral
for new loans. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) employ such a framework in the dynamic
equilibrium model they develop in order to analyze the transmission mechanism in the
case of temporary shocks. Kiyotaki and Moore show that small, temporary shocks
to technology or income distribution can generate large, persistent fluctuations in
output and asset prices.7 Another study employing land as collateral by von Hagen
and Zhang (2008a) investigates the welfare implications of financial liberalization in
a real, small open economy and suggests that financial opening facilitates the inflow
of cheap foreign funds and improves production efficiency.
The uncertainty involved in the production process requires also in the framework
here special attention to the design of the loan contracts between the firms and the
financial intermediaries. However, in the current framework, it is the capital stock of
the firms that is suggested to be used as collateral by the firms in the case of failure
of their projects. Therefore, the loan contracts specify the rate of interest on loans
that is going to be valid in the case of success and the percentage of the capital stock
of the firms to be handed over to the financial intermediaries in the case of failure.
In this context, the output produced by the firms using capital and labor as inputs is
the return of the projects in the case of success. It is assumed that there is no output
in the case of failure. Due to this probability of zero output in the case of failure,
firms have to use their capital stock as collateral in order to be able to borrow loans
from financial intermediaries.
Discussions regarding the contribution of technology shocks to business cycles have
6For more information on models with financial intermediation, see Freixas and Rochet (1997).
7For an analysis on the propagation of aggregate fluctuations in general, see Bernanke et al.
(1996).
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been controversial since the pioneering work by Kydland and Prescott (1982). It
has been argued that the contribution of technology shocks to aggregate fluctuations
depends on several factors including the extent of imperfect competition, external
economies of scale, overtime wage premiums and measurement errors in labor input
and output, as also pointed out by Aiyagari (1994). Consequently, in order to be able
to determine the exact contribution of technology shocks to business cycles, precise
quantitative measures of these factors would be required. In this chapter, it is aimed
to examine the implications of both technology shocks and monetary shocks for ag-
gregate fluctuations taking into account the potential impact of degree of financial
integration.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the model and
presents the solution of the model that consists of the system of equations including
the first-order conditions and the market-clearing conditions. The simulation of the
model, summary statistics, the impulse response functions and the sensitivity analy-
ses are given in section 2.3. Finally, section 2.4 comprises the concluding remarks.
52
2.2 The Model
The model developed here is one of cash in advance (CIA), similar to the model em-
ployed by Nason and Cogley (1994), modified in a way so as to incorporate financial
integration. All decisions are made after, and therefore completely reflect, the current
period surprise change in money growth and technology. For the timing of the stock
variables, like money and capital stock, ”stock as of the end of the period” convention
is used. For instance, Mt denotes the money stock as of the end of period t, that is
to be transferred to period t+1, and Kt is the capital stock at the end of period t.
The economy consists of households, firms, foreign lenders, financial intermediaries,
the central bank and the financial regulator.
Infinitely lived households, that are assumed to be the owners of the financial interme-
diaries, maximize their utility functions that depend on consumption, Ct, and hours
worked, Ht. They decide how much money to deposit at the financial intermediaries,
DDt, in order to earn RHt−1 of net interest, how much to spend on consumption, and
how much labor to supply to the firms. At the beginning of each period, households
receive their previous period deposits plus the interest payment, and make current
period deposits at the financial intermediaries. They also supply labor, earn wage
income and decide how much consumption to make and how much money to transfer
to the next period. There is no bond market in the economy, therefore there are no
bond holdings of households.
Firms are owned by entrepreneurs, who have a finite but stochastic lifetime. Every
period, a certain mass of entrepreneurs receives a signal of death and leaves the econ-
omy, whereas new entrepreneurs of equal mass enter the economy next period. In
the aggregate, the share of entrepreneurs in the society is constant. Entrepreneurs
maximize profits, Ft, by choosing next period’s capital stock, Kt, labor demand, Nt,
and loans, Lt, they borrow from financial intermediaries. At the beginning of every
period, the existing entrepreneurs in the economy pay back the loans they borrowed
in the previous period from the financial intermediaries including the interest and
borrow new loans for the current period. Entrepreneurs then use these loans to hire
labor for production. The new entrants, on the other hand, are assumed to bring
along some initial wealth with which they can buy the capital stock they need for
production from the financial intermediaries.
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There is Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type of uncertainty in the production process.
Firms have two available project choices to produce the single consumption good8,
both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk; namely, they yield positive return in
the case of success and zero return in the case of failure. The projects differ according
to their probabilities of success, with pH in the case of project ”good” and pL in the
case of project ”bad”. The reason why the entrepreneur might have incentives to
choose project ”bad” is that it yields some private benefits, PB, to the entrepreneur.
Project ”good” yields no private benefits. It is assumed, as in von Hagen and Zhang
(2008a), that the project outcomes can be perfectly verified by the financial interme-
diaries while the project choices of the entrepreneurs are unobservable.
Foreign lenders are assumed to supply funds, FDt, infinitely elastically at a constant
interest rate, R∗, that is lower than the domestic loan rate.
Finally, financial intermediaries (FI henceforth) maximize the expected infinite hori-
zon discounted stream of dividends, Bt, they pay to households. They receive cash
deposits from households, DDt, cash deposits from foreign investors, FDt, and cash
injections, Xt, from the central bank (which equal the net change in nominal money
balances, Mt −Mt−1). The FI then use these funds to give loans to firms. According
to the loan contract between the FI and the firms, the FI gain a net return of RFt− 1
in the case of success of the firms’ projects and a certain fraction, µ, of the capital
stock of the firms in the case of failure. The FI are allowed to hold no more than a
certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. At the beginning of each
period, financial intermediaries receive the loans they lent to firms in the previous
period inclusive of the interest payments, sell the capital stock they have acquired
from firms whose projects failed, and pay back the domestic and foreign deposits they
collected in the previous period together with the interest. Additionally, they accept
current period deposits from households and foreign lenders and give current period
loans to firms.
Financial integration is captured in this model by the fraction of foreign deposits over
total deposits the FI collect. Higher levels of this fraction imply higher degrees of
financial integration.
8The consumption good and the capital good are assumed to be identical for analytical purposes.
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2.2.1 Households
A typical household maximizes an expected utility function of the form
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt[(1− φ)lnCt + φln(1−Ht)]
}
, 0 < β, φ < 1, (2.1)
where β is the discount factor, subject to the CIA constraint
PtCt ≤Mt−1 +WtHt −DDt +RH,t−1DDt−1 (2.2)
where it is assumed that the money stock transferred from the previous period, labour
income and interest income on previous period deposits net of current period deposits
are available for consumption purchases of households. The household budget con-
straint is given as
Mt = Mt−1 +WtHt − PtCt +RH,t−1DDt−1 −DDt +Bt (2.3)
Households’ maximization problem is also subject to the nonnegativity constraint on
domestic deposits
0 ≤ DDt (2.4)
where Pt and Wt denote the price level of the single consumption good and the nominal
wage rate, respectively. Bt refers to the dividends paid to households by financial
intermediaries. RHt is the gross nominal interest rate on household deposits. DDt is
denominated in domestic currency.
2.2.2 Firms
As in the framework in Chapter 1, there is a certain mass of entrepreneurs in the
population that runs the firms in the economy. Each period, pi percent of them
dies and new entrants of an equal mass are added to the population such that the
size of the population remains the same. At the micro level, this means that, with
probability pi, each entrepreneur receives a signal every period that he will die at
the end of the period. Entrepreneurs receiving this signal consume everything that
is left of their wealth at the end of the period after paying back their debts. The
new entrants bring along some initial wealth with which they can obtain the capital
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stock they need to start production. They buy this capital stock from the financial
intermediaries, which receive capital stock as repayment of loans in the case of failure
of the firms’ projects. Entrepreneurs, therefore, maximize profits taking into account
this probability of death. There is uncertainty involved in the production process
of the firm, resulting from the fact that the entrepreneur has two available projects
to produce goods, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk. More specifically,
the entrepreneur has two project choices that differ according to their probabilities of
success and the private benefits they provide to the entrepreneur, and there is positive
output in the case of success of the projects while there is no output in the case of
failure. pH and pL denote the probabilities of success of the ”good” and the ”bad”
project, respectively, where 0 < pL < pH < 1. The entrepreneur gets PB amount of
private benefits per capital stock if he chooses the project ”bad” whereas there is no
private benefit obtained from the project ”good”. The entrepreneur’s payoffs from
the projects can be summarized as follows:
In the case of ”good project”:
pH [PtYt −RFtLt] + (1− pH)[0− µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt]
In the case of ”bad project”:
pL[PtYt −RFtLt] + (1− pL)[0− µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt] + PBKtPt
Entrepreneurs’ profits, Ft, are given as
Ft ≤ pHPtYt − pHpiRFtLt − pH(1− pi)RF,t−1Lt−1 − (1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt (2.5)
where δ is the constant physical depreciation rate of capital. Given that the en-
trepreneur chooses the project ”good” (which will be the case as long as the incentive
constraint stated below holds), with probability pH the firm is able to make use of
the loans it borrows from the FI to hire Nt amount of labor, which it can employ
together with the capital stock it has, Kt−1, to produce Yt amount of output. The
entrepreneur makes in this case an interest payment to the FI for the loans at the
rate specified in the loan contract, RFt. In the case of failure, there is no output
produced and the entrepreneur has to transfer a certain amount of its capital stock,
which it used as collateral in order to be able to borrow from the FI, to the FI. µ
56
represents the fraction of the capital stock of the firm guaranteed in the loan contract
to be handed over to the FI in the case of failure. Due to the fact that capital stock
is employed in the production process and therefore subject to depreciation indepen-
dent of the project outcome of the firm, it is the net-of-depreciation amount of capital
stock, the fraction of which is to be handed over to the FI in the case of failure. The
period t loans of the firm, Lt, and the period t wage payments, WtNt, cancel out above.
The production function of the firm is given by
Yt = K
α
t−1(AtNt)
1−α (2.6)
where At denotes technology, the shock process of which is a unit root with drift in
the log of technology, given as
lnAt = γ + lnAt−1 + A,t, A,t ∼ N(0, σ2A) (2.7)
The capital accumulation equation is given as
Kt = p
H [piµ(1−δ)Kt−1+(1−pi)(It+(1−δ)Kt−1)]+(1−pH)(1−µ)(1−δ)Kt−1, 0 < δ < 1
(2.8)
Kt is the level of physical capital to be employed in the production process at time
t+1, determined by the entrepreneur at time t. Equation (2.8) is the capital accu-
mulation equation at the macro level in the sense that pi represents here the mass,
out of a group of entrepreneurs, that dies each period, rather than the probability
of death of a single entrepreneur, as in the micro sense. Therefore, the first term
in the paranthesis on the right-hand side of the equation, piµ(1 − δ)Kt−1, stands for
the capital stock held by the new entrants at the beginning of every period (recall
the assumption that an equal mass, pi, of new entrepreneurs enter the economy each
period so that the total size of the population remains unchanged). The second term
represents the amount of capital stock accumulated by the successful entrepreneurs
continuing to live and produce; the net-of-depreciation amount of capital stock of the
current period, (1− δ)Kt−1, plus the amount of investment, It. Investment is equal to
the real profits made by the successful entrepreneurs in the economy. The last term
on the right-hand side of the equation gives the amount of the capital stock of the
unsuccessful entrepreneurs that cannot make positive real profits due to the fact that
there is no output in the case of failure of the firms’ projects.
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In order to make the capital accumulation process more clear, the profit and the
capital accumulation functions are rewritten below from a micro perspective such
that the profit made and the capital stock accumulated are captured separately for
the cases of success and failure of the projects. Let F st and K
s
t (F
f
t and K
f
t ) denote
the profit and the capital stock, respectively, accumulated by a single entrepreneur
in the case of success (failure) of the projects. Then, the profit made and the capital
stock accumulated are given as
Ft = F
s
t p
H + F ft (1− pH) (2.9)
and
Kt = K
s
t p
H(1− pi) +Kft (1− pH) (2.10)
The profits made in the case of success of the projects, which are invested, and there-
fore transferred to the next period, by the entrepreneurs, are given by the following
equation:
F st = PtYt − piRFtLt − (1− pi)RF,t−1Lt−1 (2.11)
The corresponding capital stock in the case of success of the projects is, therefore,
given as
Kst = F
s
t /Pt + (1− δ)Kt−1 (2.12)
In the case of failure of the firms’ projects, there is no output produced; therefore,
profits are
F ft = −µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt (2.13)
whereas the capital stock is given as
Kft = F
f
t /Pt + (1− δ)Kt−1 = (1− µ)(1− δ)Kt−1 (2.14)
Plugging equations (2.17) and (2.14) into equation (2.15), the capital accumulation
equation given in equation (2.8) is obtained at the micro level.
Entrepreneurs’ maximization problem is subject to the constraint reflecting the fact
that the firm finances its wage payments with the loans it borrows from the FI. Hence,
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it obeys
WtNt ≤ Lt (2.15)
Finally, there is an incentive constraint for the entrepreneur to choose the project
”good”:
PtYt −RFtLt ≥ PBKtPt
(pH − pL) (2.16)
As long as this constraint holds, the entrepreneur maximizes profits given in equation
(2.5) that is written for the case of project ”good”. The incentive constraint also gives
the borrowing constraint of the firm
RFtLt ≤ PtYt − PBKtPt
(pH − pL) (2.17)
from which the loan demand, Ldt , is obtained:
Ldt =
PtYt − PBKtPt(pH−pL)
RFt
(2.18)
In the standard collateralized borrowing literature, the maximum amount of loans
supplied to the firms by the FIs is determined according to the value of the collateral
firms have. More precisely, the value of the loans the FIs supply does not exceed the
value of the collateral of the firms, which is exactly what the collateral constraints
imply. However, in those frameworks, the total supply of loans is often fixed (limited).
Therefore, it is an optimal allocation problem of loans and assets (that are used as
collateral) among agents with differing productivities. In the current framework, the
total amount of loans available is determined in part stochastically, due to the fact
that it is the sum of total deposits and the monetary injection the FIs hold and that
the monetary injection is an exogenous stochastic process. As a result, the optimiza-
tion problem here has to do with the allocation of the incoming (injected) new loans
available to the FIs. In the standard CIA literature, where the total supply of loans
is subject to uncertainty similar to our framework here, the allocation problem of the
new loans is solved through the adjustment of the loan rate. To be more specific,
as the total supply of loans increase, the loan rate falls so that the firms continue
to demand the extra loans available, and the FIs continue to supply the extra loans
to the firms as long as their return (the loan rate) is positive. However, in those
frameworks, there is no uncertainty in the production process; therefore, there is no
need for collateralized borrowing. The major novelty of the model in this chapter is
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to reconcile these two strands of literature with the motivation of analyzing aggregate
fluctuations and propagation mechanisms under increasing financial integration for
an economy with uncertainty and frictions.
For the FI to continue lending the new resources available as loans to firms, the return
on the loans must be positive and greater than the return on any outside option of
the FI; that is,
pHRFt + (1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt+1
Lt
≥ RHt > 0 (2.19)
where RHt represents the return on the outside option of the FI, namely, lending to
other FIs.9 The parameters of the model are calibrated in such a way that the in-
equality holds.
The inequality also gives the loan supply, Lst :
Lst =
(1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt+1
(RHt − pHRFt) (2.20)
The loan market equilibrium condition is obtained through equating the loan supply
and the loan demand equations.
2.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
The objective of the FI is to maximize the expected infinite horizon discounted stream
of dividends it pays to households:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt+1
Bt
Ct+1Pt+1
}
(2.21)
subject to first the budget constraint
Bt ≤ [pHpiRFtLt+pH(1−pi)RF,t−1Lt−1]+[(1−pH)µ(1−δ)Kt−2Pt]−RH,t−1DDt−1−R∗FDt−1Et−1
(2.22)
9The return on loans just has to be positive, once the assumption that FIs can lend to and borrow
from one another is relaxed.
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where FDt ≥ 0 is denominated in foreign currency and Et is the nominal exchange rate
(the domestic currency value of one unit of the foreign currency). Purchasing power
parity (PPP) holds so that Pt = EtP
∗
t , with P
∗
t denoting the foreign price level. P
∗
t is
normalized to 1; therefore, the fluctuations in the exchange rate due to the monetary
and technology shocks are captured by the movements in the domestic price level.
The net present value of future dividends is discounted by the marginal utility of con-
sumption due to the fact that financial intermediaries are owned by households and
that an extra unit of dividend is valued by households to the extent that it enables
future consumption. The monetary injection, Xt, and the total deposits at the FI in
period t, Dt, are used by the FI for the period t loans, Lt; therefore, they cancel out
in the budget constraint of the FI.
Xt is the monetary injection during date t, Xt = Mt − Mt−1, defined similarly to
Nason and Cogley (1994).10
The exogenous stochastic process for the growth rate of the monetary injection is
given as
lnmt = (1− ρ)lnm∗ + ρlnmt−1 + M,t, M,t ∼ N(0, σ2M) (2.23)
where mt =
Mt
Mt−1
.
It is therefore an autoregressive stationary process in the growth rate of money, but
an AR(2) with a unit root in the log of the level of money. This can be seen from the
definition of mt which can be rewritten as lnMt = lnMt−1 + lnmt.
The second constraint the FI faces, namely the balance sheet constraint, requires that
the liabilities of the FI are less than or equal to its assets
Dt +Xt ≤ Lt (2.24)
where Dt = DDt + FDtEt and FDtEt = ψDt, DDt = (1− ψ)Dt.
10It can be seen from the households’ budget constraint that Xt equals the total income of house-
holds (labor income+interest on deposits+dividends from the financial intermediaries) minus con-
sumption, which cannot be negative since households are assumed to transfer some cash to the next
period.
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ψ represents the financial openness parameter assumed to be controlled by the finan-
cial regulator and varies between 0 and 1. Higher levels of ψ imply higher degrees of
financial integration.
2.2.4 System of Equations
In a stochastic setting, the solution of the model is not a series of numbers that match
a given set of equations, as in a deterministic setting. In a stochastic environment,
the best thing agents can do is to specify a decision, policy or feedback rule for the
future, in other words, their optimal actions contingent on each possible realization of
shocks. Therefore, it is a function satisfying the model’s equilibrium conditions that
is being searched. The system of equations consists of the first-order conditions of
the agents’ optimization problems and the market-clearing conditions of the goods,
labor, money and credit markets.
The following first-order conditions are obtained from the household’s optimization
problem:
(1− φ)
Ct
=
φPt
Wt(1−Ht) (2.25)
from the maximization of the household’s utility function with respect to consumption,
and
βRHt
Wt+1(1−Ht+1) =
1
Wt(1−Ht) (2.26)
from the maximization with respect to deposits.
Combining (2.25) and (2.26) gives
1
CtPt
=
βRHt
Ct+1Pt+1
(2.27)
From the firm’s optimization problem, the binding borrowing constraint
RFtLt(p
H − pL) = PtYt(pH − pL)− PBKtPt (2.28)
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and the equilibrium condition that the marginal product of labor equals the real wage
Kαt−1(1− α)(AtNt)−αAt =
Wt
Pt
(2.29)
are among the system of equations constituting the solution of the model.
Finally, the FI maximizes its dividends with respect to deposits, which leads to the
following first order condition:
pHpiRFtPt+2Ct+2 = βPt+1Ct+1[(1− ψ)RHt + ψR∗ − pH(1− pi)RFt] (2.30)
As stated above, all markets clear in equilibrium. The following equations represent
equilibrium in the goods, labor, money, and credit markets, respectively:
Ct + It +NXt = Yt (2.31)
Nt = Ht (2.32)
PtCt = Mt−1 +Xt (2.33)
Dt +Xt = Lt (2.34)
NXt denotes net exports, which is equal to the net interest payment on foreign borrow-
ing minus the change in the amount of foreign borrowing in a given period. Therefore,
PtNXt = (R
∗ − 1)FDt−1Et−1 − [FDt−1Et−1 − FDtEt] (2.35)
Combining (2.15), (2.25) and (2.32) gives
(
φ
1− φ)
PtCt
1−Nt =
Lt
Nt
(2.36)
which constitutes another equation of the solution.
Finally, there is the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition
Pt = EtP
∗
t (2.37)
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with P ∗t = 1, which is used to convert the foreign currency denominated foreign
deposits into domestic currency in the system of equations.
The model, however, needs to be made stationary first so that it can be linearized
around the steady-state and that it returns to the steady-state after a shock. The
problem of non-stationarity arises because of having stochastic trends in money and
technology. In the absence of shocks, real variables grow with At (except Nt which
is stationary since there is no population growth), nominal variables grow with Mt
and prices grow with Mt/At. Detrending is carried out as follows (where hats above
variables denote stationarity):
For real variables, qˆt = qt/At where qt = [Yt, Ct, Kt]. For nominal variables, zˆt = zt/Mt
where zt = [Wt, Dt, Lt]. For prices, Pˆt = PtAt/Mt.
The stationary system of equations is as follows:
(1− φ)(1−Nt)Ltmt = φPtCtNt (2.38)
mtCt+1Pt+1 = βRHtCtPt (2.39)
RFtLt(p
H − pL)mt = PtYt(pH − pL)− PBKtPt (2.40)
Kαt−1(1− α)a−αt N−αt = Wtmt (2.41)
pHpiRFtPt+2Ct+2mt+1 = βPt+1Ct+1[(1− ψ)RHt + ψR∗ − pH(1− pi)RFt] (2.42)
Ct + It +NXt = Yt (2.43)
PtCt = mt (2.44)
DDt
(1− ψ) + 1−
1
mt
= Lt (2.45)
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WtNt = Lt (2.46)
Yt = K
α
t−1a
−α
t N
1−α
t (2.47)
Ktat = p
H [piµ(1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− pi)(Itat + (1− δ)Kt−1)] + (1− pH)(1− µ)(1− δ)Kt−1
(2.48)
NXt = ψ[(R
∗ − 1)DDt−1 −DDt−1 +DDtmt]/(1− ψ)Pt (2.49)
Given the equations (2.38)-(2.49) and the shock processes (2.7) and (2.23), the ex-
pected future paths of the variables [Yt, Ct, It, NXt, Pt, DDt, Lt, Nt, Kt, Wt,RFt,RHt],
namely, the impulse response functions, conditional on temporary money growth and
technology shocks in period 1 are obtained next.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Simulation
The procedure of making the model stationary is followed by linearization and simula-
tion.11 The model is linearized up to first order.12 The perturbation method employed
to solve and to simulate the model can be summarized as follows: The solution to
the system of equations obtained in the previous section is a set of equations relating
variables in the current period to the past state of the system and current shocks, that
satisfy the original system. These are referred to as ”the policy functions”. In the lin-
earization up to first order, future shocks enter the linearized system of equations only
with their first moments (which are zero in expectations); therefore, they drop out
when taking expectations of the equations. This is why certainty equivalence holds
in the system linearized up to first order. The (approximate) policy functions are
obtained by first rewriting the system in terms of past variables, current and future
shocks, and then linearizing it around the steady states. Impulse response functions
are then acquired simply through iterating the policy functions starting from some
initial values (given by the steady states).13
For simulations, the following values are assigned to the structural parameters of the
model: α=0.32, β=0.99, φ=0.76, δ=0.025, γ=0.003, ρ=0.7.14 For the success prob-
ability of project ”bad” and the unconditional mean of monetary injection growth,
pL=0.1 and m∗=1.01, respectively, are used. The fraction of the capital stock to be
used as collateral by firms, µ, is taken to be equal to 0.1, whereas the probability of
death of firm managers, pi, is set to 0.9. The parameter measuring the private benefits
11The linearization and the simulation of the model are carried out using DYNARE, which is a
pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB routines that have been developed to support modern
macro modeling.
12In the case of linearization up to the first order, agents behave as if future shocks were equal to
zero (since their expectation is null), due to certainty equivalence. In the linearization up to second
order, agents make their decisions knowing that the future value of innovations are random but
will have zero mean. This is not the same thing because of Jensen’s inequality. For more detailed
information, see DYNARE User Guide.
13The impulse response functions presented in the next section depict the responses of the variables
in terms of deviations from the steady states.
14For the parameter values, Mendoza (1991), Nason and Cogley (1994) and Dib (2003) are followed.
Dib (2003) employs quarterly Canadian data for the calibration and the estimation in his small-open-
economy DSGE model.
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of entrepreneurs from project ”bad”, PB, is taken as 0.5.
Three parameters are of special interest, namely, ψ -the parameter measuring the
degree of financial integration, pH -the success probability of project ”good”, and R∗
-the gross interest rate on foreign deposits. These parameters are interrelated through
equation (2.42), which relates the loan rate, the interest rate on domestic deposits and
the interest rate on foreign deposits. Due to the fact that degree of financial integra-
tion, captured by ψ, is the main parameter of interest here, those parameters that are
closely linked to ψ should be analyzed carefully in the simulations as well, since they
might also play crucial roles in the analysis of the implications of financial integration
for the impact of shocks on the economy. Simulations are run using the following
sets of values for those parameters: ψ = [0.5, 0.75, 0.99], R∗ = [1.01, 1.001, 1.0001],
and pH = [0.7, 0.8, 0.9]. In the next sections, the summary statistics and the impulse
response functions are presented.15
15In a stochastic setup, DYNARE computes impulse response functions, by default, for one positive
standard deviation of each of the shocks.
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2.3.2 Summary Statistics
Solving a rational expectations model means finding an unknown function that could
be inserted into the original model and satisfy the implied restrictions, i.e., the first
order conditions. A first order approximation of such a function can be written in
terms of the steady-state values of the variables, the deviations of the variables from
the steady states, the partial derivatives of the function with respect to the variables
and the stochastic error terms. In other words, the function is a time recursive repre-
sentation of the model that can generate time series which will approximately satisfy
the rational expectations hypothesis in the original model. The policy and transition
functions given below in Table 2.1 contain the partial derivatives mentioned above.
In Table 2.2, the moments of the simulated variables are presented; whereas the cor-
relations and the autocorrelations of the simulated variables are given in Table 2.3
and 2.4, respectively.
Table 2.1: Policy and Transition Functions
Var. I L N NX Rf W Y DD K C P
Const. -0.22 -0.29 -0.09 -0.001 1.01 2.87 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.15 6.6
Kt−1 2.4 2.25 0.86 0.32 0 2.25 1.18 0.23 0.47 -1.57 67.2
mt−1 0.08 0.4 0.16 -0.07 -0.28 0.4 0.07 -0.03 0.01 0.05 2.2
A,t 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04 1.8
M,t 0.12 0.59 0.23 -0.1 -0.41 0.59 0.1 -0.04 0.01 0.08 3.2
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Table 2.2: Moments of Simulated Variables
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis
DD -0.03 0.005 0.00002 0.02 0.17
I -0.21 0.01 0.0002 -0.02 -0.14
L -0.29 0.06 0.004 -0.01 0.05
NX -0.0005 0.01 0.0001 0.04 -0.13
Y -0.07 0.01 0.0001 -0.01 0.004
C 0.15 0.01 0.0001 -0.01 0.11
N -0.1 0.02 0.001 -0.01 0.05
W 2.87 0.06 0.004 -0.01 0.05
P 6.55 0.48 0.23 0.01 0.02
Rh 1.01 0.08 0.006 -0.02 0.11
Rf 1.11 0.04 0.002 0.02 0.11
Table 2.3: Correlations of Simulated Variables
Variables C DD I K L N NX P Rf W Y
C 1 -0.86 0.51 0.24 0.8 0.8 -0.87 0.55 -0.83 0.8 0.67
DD -0.87 1 -0.77 -0.61 -0.96 -0.96 0.8 -0.88 0.99 -0.96 -0.92
I 0.51 -0.77 1 0.95 0.9 0.9 -0.78 0.93 -0.85 0.9 0.95
K 0.24 -0.6 0.95 1 0.77 0.77 -0.54 0.89 -0.7 0.77 0.87
L 0.8 -0.96 0.9 0.77 1 1 -0.86 0.94 -0.99 1 0.98
N 0.8 -0.96 0.9 0.77 1 1 -0.86 0.94 -0.99 1 0.98
NX -0.87 0.8 -0.78 -0.54 -0.86 -0.86 1 -0.65 0.84 -0.86 -0.79
P 0.55 -0.88 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.94 -0.65 1 -0.92 0.94 0.98
Rf -0.83 0.99 -0.85 -0.7 -0.99 -0.99 0.84 -0.92 1 -0.99 -0.96
W 0.8 -0.96 0.9 0.77 1 1 -0.86 0.94 -0.99 1 0.98
Y 0.67 -0.92 0.95 0.87 0.98 0.98 -0.79 0.98 -0.96 0.98 1
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Table 2.4: Autocorrelations of Simulated Variables
Variables 1 2 3 4 5
DD 0.73 0.48 0.3 0.17 0.09
I 0.55 0.33 0.21 0.11 0.06
L 0.63 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.07
Y 0.67 0.44 0.28 0.16 0.08
C 0.44 0.26 0.15 0.07 0.04
N 0.63 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.07
W 0.63 0.41 0.26 0.14 0.07
P 0.76 0.5 0.32 0.18 0.09
Rh 0.68 0.44 0.28 0.16 0.08
Rf 0.68 0.44 0.28 0.16 0.08
In order to have an idea about the cyclical variability of the variables, one can take a
look at Table 2.2, where the moments of the simulated variables are presented. Invest-
ment exhibits a slightly higher degree of variability than output. The correlations of
the simulated variables presented in Table 2.3 are the contemporaneous correlations.
It can be seen that output is positively correlated with investment, consumption and
labor demand, whereas it is negatively correlated with net exports. The impulse re-
sponse functions given in the next section exhibit the countercyclical behavior of net
exports, which is one of the key empirical regularities typical of open economies.16
Moreover, labor demand and stock of capital have high positive correlations with
output. Loans and labor demand are perfectly and positively correlated with each
other, which makes sense due to the fact that firms borrow loans from financial in-
termediaries which they then use to hire labor. Finally, autocorrelations of simulated
variables, given in Table 2.4, are up to the fifth lag, with correlations decreasing for
higher lags.
16See, among others, Backus et al. (1994).
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2.3.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 2.1: Temporary Monetary Shock
Figure 2.1 displays the impulse response functions of the variables in the model in the
case of a positive, one-time, temporary money growth shock in period 1.17 The model
predicts an expansion in output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans,
and a contraction in domestic deposits, net exports and domestic loan rate in response
to the monetary shock. Considering the fact that the FIs use the deposits they collect
plus the monetary injection to give loans to the firms and that the firms use these
loans to hire labor for production, an increase in the monetary injection is expected
to lead to the above-mentioned expansions in loans, labor demand and production. It
can also be seen that the loan rate falls in response to the positive monetary shock,
which actually constitutes the mechanism through which the loans given to the firms
increase. As a result of the monetary injection, the FIs have more funds available to
give loans to the firms and since they do not have any other alternative to evaluate
17The values used in the simulations that lead to the impulse responses presented here are ψ = 0.9,
R∗ = 1.01 and pH = 0.9.
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their funds, they continue supplying loans to the firms at lower rates. These results
regarding the impact of increasing monetary injection on an economy with financial
intermediation are consistent with those in the CIA literature.18 Moreover, higher
money growth resulting in higher output is consistent with the empirical literature
that shows the positive correlation between output growth and money growth.19 Last
but not least, net exports exhibit countercyclical behavior as a result of the monetary
shock, which might be explained by a strong income effect on imports, as in the
traditional models of the current account.
18For standard CIA modelling, see, among others, Fuerst (1992) and Schorfheide (2000).
19For a more detailed analysis, see, among others, McCandless (2008).
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Figure 2.2: Temporary Technology Shock
The responses of the variables to a one-time, positive, temporary technology shock
in period 1 are depicted in figure 2.2. It can be seen that output, investment, do-
mestic deposits, loans, labor demand and net exports increase as a reaction to the
shock while consumption exhibits contraction. The increase in investment and net
exports outweighing the decrease in consumption, thereby leading to an expansion in
output makes sense considering that the shock is positive. The positive correlation
between savings and investment is in line with the evidence pointed out by Mendoza
(1991) as one of the stylized facts for open economies under imperfect capital mobility,
constituting therefore a confirmation of this argument in a monetary setting.20
20Mendoza (1991) also provides support for the argument presented by Obstfeld (1986) and Finn
(1990) that the intensity of the comovement between savings and investment in economies with
perfect capital mobility depends on the degree of persistence of the underlying technological distur-
bances.
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Figure 2.3: Temporary Monetary Shock with Varying Degrees of Financial Integration
Figure 2.3 shows the responses of the economy to a one-time, temporary money growth
shock, under three different levels of financial integration. The straight line, the dotted
line, and the dashed line represent the cases with ψ equal to 0.5, 0.75, and 0.99,
respectively. It can be seen that increasing financial integration amplifies the impact
of the monetary shock on output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans
whereas it diminishes that on domestic deposits and price level. The amplification
effect of increasing financial integration is mainly due to the fact that the output-
promoting impact of positive monetary growth is coupled with increasing access to
cheaper foreign funds that enhance production through leading to a rise in loanable
funds available for firms. As presented above in Figure 2.1, the loan rate falls in
response to a positive monetary shock due to the increase in the amount of funds
FIs have to give loans to the firms. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, increasing financial
integration leads to a further decrease in the loan rate through increasing the amount
of cheaper foreign funds the FIs hold. 21
21Simulations with different levels of financial integration were carried out also for temporary
technology shock and it was found that varying the degree of financial integration has negligible im-
74
2.3.4 Sensitivity Analyses
Some robustness checks regarding the results presented in the previous section are
undertaken in this section. Simulations are run using varying values of several pa-
rameters in the model including those that are closely linked to the basic parameter
of interest, the degree of financial integration. Equation (2.42) shows that the success
probability of project ”good”, pH , the interest rate on foreign deposits, R∗, and the
probability of death of entrepreneurs, pi, are related to one another and to the degree
of financial integration, ψ. Therefore, the impulse response functions are analyzed
under varying values of these parameters as well as of the parameter measuring the
fraction of the capital stock to be handed over to the FIs in the case of failure of
the firms’ projects, µ, and of the parameter representing the private benefits of en-
trepreneurs from ”bad” projects, PB. Below are some of the simulation experiments
that yield similar results to those presented in the previous section.
plications for the impact of a temporary technology shock on the economy. Therefore, the simulation
results are not presented here.
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Figure 2.4: Temporary Monetary Shock with PB = 0.4
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Figure 2.5: Temporary Technology Shock with PB = 0.4
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Figure 2.6: Temporary Monetary Shock with PB = 0.3, pi = 0.8
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Figure 2.7: Temporary Technology Shock with PB = 0.3, pi = 0.8
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Figure 2.8: Temporary Monetary Shock with R∗ = 1.001
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Figure 2.9: Temporary Technology Shock with R∗ = 1.001
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Figure 2.10: Temporary Monetary Shock with R∗ = 1.0001
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Figure 2.11: Temporary Technology Shock with R∗ = 1.0001
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter of the thesis, aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms are
analyzed under varying degrees of financial integration for a small open economy. Us-
ing a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial and informa-
tional frictions and uncertainty, the implications of increasing financial integration for
the impact of money growth and technology shocks on the economy are investigated.
Financial frictions in the model are in the form of restrictions on the composition of
deposits held by the financial intermediaries in the economy. More specifically, finan-
cial intermediaries are assumed to be able to hold no more than a certain fraction
of their total deposits as foreign deposits. An increase in this fraction is interpreted
as increasing financial integration. Informational asymmetries among the agents in
the economy and uncertainty in the production process necessitate financial inter-
mediation and require special attention to the design of the loan contracts between
the firms and the financial intermediaries. The Holmstrom-Tirole type of uncertainty
in the production process leads to collateralized borrowing by the firms, where the
capital stock of the firms serves as the collateral as well as the factor of production.
Financial frictions have long been investigated in the literature in terms of their busi-
ness cycle implications. Especially over the last two decades, theoretical progress as
a result of the developments in economics of information and incentives made it pos-
sible to analyze asymmetries and imperfections in financial markets. The literature
has focused on a wide array of issues related to financial frictions such as the way
financial frictions are captured, the financial infrastructure of the economies featuring
those frictions and the interaction between those frictions and other imperfections
in an economy. This chapter contributes to the existing literature by proposing a
new theoretical framework to examine aggregate economic activity and amplification
mechanisms in the case of decreasing financial frictions (defined here as increasing
financial integration), taking into account informational asymmetries and uncertainty
in production.
The small-open-economy DSGE model developed here is solved and simulated in the
case of one-time, temporary, positive money growth and technology shocks. The
model predicts an expansion in output, consumption, investment, labor demand and
loans in response to a monetary shock; whereas a technology shock leads to an increase
in output, investment, domestic deposits, loans, labor demand and net exports, and a
decrease in consumption. The simulation experiments with different levels of financial
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integration reveal that increasing financial integration amplifies the impact of tempo-
rary monetary shocks on output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans.
The amplification effect of increasing financial integration is due to the mechanism
in which the output-promoting impact of positive monetary injection is coupled with
increasing access to cheaper foreign funds that enhance production through leading
to a rise in loanable funds available for firms. The increase in the amount of funds
available for firms due to a positive monetary injection leads to a rise in the amount
of loans actually given to the firms through a fall in the loan rate, which is stimulated
further by increasing financial integration that raises the volume of cheaper foreign
funds held by financial intermediaries. The effect of increasing financial integration
in the case of temporary technology shocks is found to be rather negligible. The sen-
sitivity analyses undertaken for varying values of parameters of interest reveal that
the results regarding the impact of temporary monetary and technology shocks on a
small open economy are robust.
The model presented here confirms, in a monetary framework, the findings of the real
business cycle literature on small open economies and the empirical regularities typical
of open economies in terms of the procyclicality of investment and consumption, and
the countercyclicality of external trade. In addition, a positive correlation between
savings and investment is found in the case of technology shocks under imperfect cap-
ital mobility, which is also consistent with the results of the benchmark framework
in the business cycle literature for small open economies. Analyzing the impact of
monetary shocks on the economy under varying degrees of financial integration allows
one to gain insights into the design of optimal monetary policy in the case of varying
levels of financial integration. Moreover, the current framework might be extended
further to include business cycle implications of other shocks as well as fiscal policy
analyses. The following chapter of this thesis takes the first step towards that through
providing a framework that includes also a government sector to analyze risk premium
shocks.
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Chapter 3
Risk Premium Shocks and
Aggregate Fluctuations in a Small
Open Economy
3.1 Introduction
The implications of default risk premiums for the business cycles in emerging economies
have been investigated extensively over the last decade.1 One strand of literature fo-
cuses on the effects of movements in domestic variables on country risk premiums and
documents that risk premiums respond systematically and countercyclically to the
business cycles in emerging economies. 2 Another line of research assumes that risk
premiums are exogenous to the domestic conditions in emerging countries. Authors
advocating this argument relate the risk premium and the world interest rate through
some exogenous, stochastic process and attempt to partially explain aggregate volatil-
ity in small open economies with interest rate fluctuations. 3This chapter of the thesis
proposes a theoretical framework incorporating financial and informational frictions
as well as uncertainty to examine aggregate fluctuations in response to risk premium
shocks in a small open economy.4 Financial frictions in the model are in the form
1See, among others, Arellano (2008).
2See, among others, Edwards (1984), Cline (1995), Cline and Barnes (1997) and Eichengreen and
Mody (2000).
3Neumeyer and Perri (2001) provide evidence for the fact that interest rate shocks constitute an
important factor for explaining business cycles in emerging economies.
4For a detailed analysis on the relationships between country risk premiums, business cycles and
emerging market fundamentals, see Uribe and Yue (2006).
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of restrictions on the composition of deposits held by the domestic financial interme-
diaries in the economy. More specifically, financial intermediaries are assumed to be
able to hold no more than a certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits.
Informational asymmetries among the agents in the economy and uncertainty in the
production process necessitate financial intermediation and require special attention
to the design of the loan contracts between the lenders (financial intermediaries) and
the borrowers (firms) in the economy.
In this chapter, a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial
and informational frictions is developed in order to analyze the impact of risk premium
shocks on a small open economy. In other words, aggregate fluctuations in response
to risk premium shocks are investigated. It is shown that positive, temporary risk
premium shocks lead to an increase in domestic deposits, loans, nominal exchange
rate, tax rate and government spending, and a decrease in consumption, output, la-
bor supply, investment and government borrowing. There is a cash-in-advance (CIA)
framework, similar to that in Nason and Cogley (1994), modified in such a way that
it includes financial and informational frictions. The economy consists of households,
firms, foreign lenders, financial intermediaries, the government, the central bank and
the financial regulator. The government in the economy is assumed to borrow do-
mestically from the households with an endogenous partial default risk. In order to
compensate the households, that also have the options of depositing at the financial
intermediaries or holding foreign bonds, for the risk involved in the government bonds,
the government offers households some risk premium in addition to the international
interest rate prevailing for the foreign bond holdings.
Risk premium is, by definition, relevant for emerging economies that are exposed
to risks of default on debt due to their lack of adequately developed financial and
macroeconomic infrastructure. Therefore, the implications of risk premium shocks for
aggregate fluctuations are of special importance for emerging economies, that are also
facing financial frictions. These two crucial aspects of emerging markets; namely, ex-
posure to default risk and financial frictions, are combined in this chapter in a DSGE
framework with financial intermediation.
The default risk has been modeled both exogenously and endogenously in several
different frameworks in the literature. Mendoza and Yue (2008) explain output dy-
namics around defaults, countercyclical spreads, high debt ratios and key business
cycle moments in a model with simultaneous default on public and private foreign
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obligations. They attempt to propose a model that reconciles the business cycle
models treating default risk exogenously and the sovereign default models treating
output fluctuations exogenously. They develop a model of strategic sovereign default
with endogenous output dynamics and examine its quantitative predictions.5 Bi and
Leeper (2010) criticize the strategic default literature due to its inability to match
the data. More precisely, they argue that the default frequency is predicted by this
literature to be far too high and the level of debt at which default occurs far too low.
They propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where the perceived
riskiness of government debt depends partly on the fiscal environment, to study the
tradeoffs between short-run fiscal stimulus and long-run sustainability.
The economy analyzed in this chapter features financial frictions restricting the amount
of foreign borrowing in the economy, informational asymmetries among the agents in
the economy, and imperfections of the Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type of uncertainty
in the production process. Entrepreneurs that run the firms have two different project
choices for production, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk. The projects
yield positive output in the case of success and no output in the case of failure. The
projects differ according to their probabilities of success and the private benefits they
provide to the entrepreneurs. It is those private benefits that create incentives for the
managers of the firms, inducing them to act against the interest of their creditors.
The project choices of the entrepreneurs are private information, whereas the project
outcomes are verifiable by the financial intermediaries. Households and foreign in-
vestors are assumed to lack the ability to verify the project outcomes. Therefore,
domestic and foreign investors prefer lending to firms indirectly, through financial in-
termediaries, rather than directly.
Exploring the potential impact of financial frictions on aggregate fluctuations has
long been a topic of interest in the literature.6 Financial markets and institutions
have been considered to have significant effects on aggregate economic activity. Fi-
nancial frictions are incorporated into the model here through the introduction of a
regulation in the economy that the financial intermediaries can hold no more than a
5The strategic default literature has grown out of the papers by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and
Eaton et al. (1986). This strand of literature models default on external debt as an optimal and
strategic decision made by the government. See, among others, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) for a
recent study following this literature.
6See von Heideken (2009) for an analysis of the implications of financial frictions for business
cycles in the US and the Euro Area.
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certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. The parameter representing
this fraction is assumed to be controlled by the financial regulator in the economy.
The implications of financial frictions for the impact of risk premium shocks on a
small open economy are investigated in this chapter of the thesis.
As mentioned above, a DSGE framework with financial intermediation and a govern-
ment sector is developed in this chapter of the thesis in order to analyze aggregate
fluctuations in the case of risk premium shocks. As far as models with financial in-
termediation are concerned, there is a literature following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
designing the loan contracts between borrowers and lenders with some durable asset,
like land, as collateral.7 In these models, lenders cannot force borrowers to repay debts
unless those debts are secured. In such a context, borrowers’ assets like land serve both
as factors of production and as collateral for new loans. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
employ such a framework in the dynamic equilibrium model they develop in order to
analyze the transmission mechanism in the case of temporary shocks. Kiyotaki and
Moore show that small, temporary shocks to technology or income distribution can
generate large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices.8 Employing land as
collateral, von Hagen and Zhang (2008a) investigate the welfare implications of finan-
cial liberalization in a real, small open economy and suggest that financial opening
facilitates the inflow of cheap foreign funds and improves production efficiency.
The loan contracts between the firms and the financial intermediaries in the current
framework must be designed in such a way that the uncertainty involved in the pro-
duction process is taken into account. At this point, collateralized borrowing becomes
relevant here. However, in the current framework, it is the capital stock of the firms
that is offered to be used as collateral by the firms in the case of failure of their pro-
duction projects. Therefore, the loan contract specifies the rate of interest on loans
that is going to be valid in the case of success and the fraction of the capital stock of
the firms to be handed over to the financial intermediaries in the case of failure. In
this context, the output produced by the firms using capital and labor as inputs is the
return of the projects in the case of success. It is assumed that there is no output in
the case of failure. Due to this probability of zero output in the case of failure, firms
have to use their capital stock as collateral in order to be able to borrow loans from
financial intermediaries.
7For more information on models with financial intermediation, see Freixas and Rochet (1997).
8For a detailed analysis on the propagation of aggregate fluctuations, see Bernanke et al. (1996).
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The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model
and presents the solution of the model that consists of the system of equations in-
cluding the first-order conditions and the market-clearing conditions. The simulation
of the model and the impulse response functions are given in section 3.3. Finally,
concluding remarks are presented in section 3.4.
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3.2 The Model
The model developed here is one of cash in advance (CIA), similar to the model em-
ployed by Nason and Cogley (1994), modified in a way so as to incorporate financial
integration. All decisions are made after, and therefore completely reflect, the current
period surprise change in money growth and technology. For the timing of the stock
variables, like money and capital stock, ”stock as of the end of the period” convention
is used. For instance, Mt denotes the money stock as of the end of period t, that is to
be transferred to period t+1, and Kt is the capital stock at the end of period t. The
economy consists of households, firms, foreign lenders and financial intermediaries as
the agents, and of the government, the central bank and the financial regulator as the
authorities.
Infinitely lived households, that are assumed to be the owners of the financial in-
termediaries, maximize their utility functions that depend on consumption, Ct, and
hours worked, Ht. They decide how much money to deposit at the bank, DDt, in
order to earn RHt − 1 of net interest, how much government bonds, GBt, to hold
at a gross interest rate of RGBt and how much foreign bonds, FBt, to hold in return
for a gross interest rate of R∗, how much to spend on consumption, and how much
labor to supply to the firms. At the beginning of each period, households receive their
deposits from the previous period plus the interest payment and make current-period
deposits at the financial intermediary. Additionally, they receive payments from the
government and the foreign bond issuers for their bond holdings from the previous
period inclusive of the interest payments and decide on bond holdings for the current
period. They also supply labor, earn wage income and decide how much consumption
to make and how much money to transfer to the next period.
Firms are owned by entrepreneurs, who have a finite but stochastic lifetime. Every
period, a certain mass of entrepreneurs receives the signal of death and leaves the
economy, whereas new entrepreneurs of equal mass enter the economy next period.
In the aggregate, the share of entrepreneurs in the society is constant. Entrepreneurs
maximize profits, Ft, by choosing next period’s capital stock, Kt, labor demand, Nt,
and loans, Lt, they borrow from financial intermediaries. At the beginning of every
period, the existing entrepreneurs in the economy pay back the loans they borrowed
in the previous period from the financial intermediaries including the interest and
borrow new loans for the current period. Entrepreneurs then use these loans to hire
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labor for production. The new entrants, on the other hand, are assumed to bring
along some initial wealth with which they can buy the capital stock they need for
production from the financial intermediaries. There is Holmstrom-Tirole (1997) type
of uncertainty in the production process. Firms have two available project choices
to produce the single consumption good9, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic
risk; namely, they yield positive return in the case of success and zero return in the
case of failure. The projects differ according to their probabilities of success, with
pH in the case of project ”good” and pL in the case of project ”bad”. The reason
why the entrepreneurs might have incentives to choose project ”bad” is that it yields
some private benefits, PB, to the entrepreneurs. Project ”good” yields no private
benefits. It is assumed that the project outcomes can be perfectly verified by the fi-
nancial intermediaries, which have the exclusive technology to do so, while the project
choices of the entrepreneurs are unobservable. It is this uncertainty that rationalizes
the existence of financial intermediation in the economy.
Foreign lenders prefer lending through the financial intermediaries instead of directly
to the firms also due to their limited familiarity with the domestic economy. They are
assumed to supply funds, FDt, infinitely elastically at a constant interest rate, R
∗,
that is lower than the domestic loan rate.
Financial intermediaries (FI henceforth) maximize the expected infinite horizon dis-
counted stream of dividends, Bt, they pay to households. They receive cash deposits
from households, DDt, cash deposits from foreign investors, FDt, and cash injection,
Xt, from the central bank (which equals the net change in nominal money balances,
Mt −Mt−1). The FI then use these funds to give loans to firms. According to the
loan contract between the FI and the firms, the FI gain a net return of RFt− 1 in the
case of success of the firms’ projects and a certain fraction, µ, of the capital stock of
the firms in the case of failure. The FI are allowed to hold no more than a certain
fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. In other words, there is an upper
limit on the fraction of the foreign deposits over total deposits to be held by the FI.
At the beginning of each period, financial intermediaries receive the loans they lent
to firms in the previous period inclusive of the interest payments, sell out the capital
stock they hold due to the probability of failure of firms’ projects, and pay back the
domestic and foreign deposits they collected in the previous period together with the
interest. Additionally, they accept current period deposits from households and for-
9The consumption good and the capital good are assumed to be identical for analytical purposes.
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eign lenders and give current period loans to firms.
Finally, the government finances unproductive government purchases, Gt, through
collecting taxes and issuing one-period government bonds, GBt. It raises tax rev-
enue through a time-varying income tax, τt. The government debt is denominated in
foreign currency and is subject to partial default risk. More specifically, only with
probability pRt , the government is able to repay its debt totally and with probability
1− pRt , it can pay only a certain fraction of its debt, determined by the parameter χ,
back to the households. In order to compensate the households for the default risk
they take, the government has to offer some risk premium in addition to the world
interest rate prevailing for the foreign bond holdings of the households.
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3.2.1 Households
A typical infinitely lived household maximizes an expected utility function of the form
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt[(1− φ)lnCt + φln(1−Ht)]
}
, 0 < β, φ < 1 (3.1)
where β is the discount factor, subject to the CIA constraint
PtCt ≤Mt−1+(1−τt)WtHt−DDt+RH,t−1DDt−1−GBtEt+Zt−FBtEt+FBt−1Et−1R∗
(3.2)
where Zt = [p
R
t GBt−1EtR
GB
t−1 + (1− pRt )χGBt−1EtRGBt−1]. It is assumed that the money
stock transferred from previous period, labour income, interest income on previous-
period deposits net of current-period deposits, and interest income on previous-period
bond holdings net of current-period bond holdings are available for consumption pur-
chases of households. The maximization problem of households is also subject to the
budget constraint
Mt = Mt−1+(1−τt)WtHt−PtCt+RH,t−1DDt−1−DDt+Zt−GBtEt+FBt−1Et−1R∗−FBtEt+Bt
(3.3)
and to the nonnegativity constraint
0 ≤ DDt (3.4)
where Pt and Wt denote the price level of the single consumption good and the nominal
wage rate, respectively. Bt refers to the dividends paid to households by financial
intermediaries. RHt is the gross nominal interest rate on household deposits. DDt is
denominated in domestic currency whereas GBt is denominated in foreign currency.
3.2.2 Firms
There is a certain mass of entrepreneurs in the population that runs the firms in the
economy. Each period, pi percent of them dies and new entrants of an equal mass are
added to the population such that the size of the population remains the same. At the
micro level, this means that, with probability pi, each entrepreneur receives a signal
every period that he will die at the end of the period. Entrepreneurs receiving this
signal consume everything that is left at the end of the period after paying back the
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debt. The new entrants bring along some initial wealth with which they can obtain
the capital stock they need to start production. They buy this capital stock from
the financial intermediaries, which receive capital stock as repayment of loans in the
case of failure of the firms’ projects. Entrepreneurs, therefore, maximize profits taking
into account this probability of death. There is uncertainty involved in the production
process of the firm, resulting from the fact that the entrepreneur has two available
projects to produce goods, both of which are subject to idiosyncratic risk. More
specifically, the entrepreneur has two project choices that differ according to their
probabilities of success and the private benefits they provide to the entrepreneur, and
there is positive output in the case of success of the projects while there is no output
in the case of failure. pH and pL denote the probabilities of success of the ”good” and
the ”bad” project, respectively, where 0 < pL < pH < 1. The entrepreneur gets PB
amount of private benefits per capital stock if he chooses the project ”bad” whereas
there is no private benefit obtained from the project ”good”. The entrepreneur’s
payoffs from the projects can be summarized as follows:
In the case of ”good project”:
pH [PtYt −RFtLt] + (1− pH)[0− µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt]
In the case of ”bad project”:
pL[PtYt −RFtLt] + (1− pL)[0− µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt] + PBKtPt
Entrepreneurs’ profits, Ft, are given as
Ft ≤ pHPtYt − pHpiRFtLt − pH(1− pi)RF,t−1Lt−1 − (1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt (3.5)
where δ is the constant physical depreciation rate of capital. Given that the en-
trepreneur chooses the project ”good” (which will be the case as long as the incentive
constraint stated below holds), with probability pH the firm is able to make use of
the loans it borrows from the FI to hire Nt amount of labor, which it can employ
together with the capital stock it has, Kt−1, to produce Yt amount of output. The
entrepreneur makes in this case an interest payment to the FI for the loans at the
rate specified in the loan contract, RFt. In the case of failure, there is no output
produced and the entrepreneur has to transfer a certain amount of its capital stock,
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which it used as collateral in order to be able to borrow from the FI, to the FI. µ
represents the fraction of the capital stock of the firm guaranteed in the loan contract
to be handed over to the FI in the case of failure. Due to the fact that capital stock
is employed in the production process and therefore subject to depreciation indepen-
dent of the project outcome of the firm, it is the net-of-depreciation amount of capital
stock, the fraction of which is to be handed over to the FI in the case of failure. The
period t loans of the firm, Lt, and the period t wage payments, WtNt, cancel out above.
The production function of the firm is given by
Yt = K
α
t−1(AtNt)
1−α (3.6)
where At denotes technology, the shock process of which is a unit root with drift in
the log of technology, given as
lnAt = γ + lnAt−1 + A,t, A,t ∼ N(0, σ2A) (3.7)
The capital accumulation equation is given as
Kt = p
H [piµ(1−δ)Kt−1+(1−pi)(It+(1−δ)Kt−1)]+(1−pH)(1−µ)(1−δ)Kt−1, 0 < δ < 1
(3.8)
Kt is the level of physical capital to be employed in the production process at time
t+1, determined by the entrepreneur at time t. Equation (3.8) is the capital accu-
mulation equation at the macro level in the sense that pi represents here the mass,
out of a group of entrepreneurs, that dies each period, rather than the probability
of death of a single entrepreneur, as in the micro sense. Therefore, the first term
in the paranthesis on the right-hand side of the equation, piµ(1 − δ)Kt−1, stands for
the capital stock held by the new entrants at the beginning of every period (recall
the assumption that an equal mass, pi, of new entrepreneurs enter the economy each
period so that the total size of the population remains unchanged). The second term
represents the amount of capital stock accumulated by the successful entrepreneurs
continuing to live and produce; the net-of-depreciation amount of capital stock of the
current period, (1− δ)Kt−1, plus the amount of investment, It. Investment is equal to
the real profits made by the successful entrepreneurs in the economy. The last term
on the right-hand side of the equation gives the amount of the capital stock of the
unsuccessful entrepreneurs that cannot make positive real profits due to the fact that
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there is no output in the case of failure of the firms’ projects.
It might help to make the capital accumulation process more clear to rewrite the
profit and the capital accumulation functions from a micro perspective such that
the profit made and the capital stock accumulated are captured separately for the
cases of success and failure of the projects. Let F st and K
s
t (F
f
t and K
f
t ) denote the
profit and the capital stock, respectively, accumulated by a single entrepreneur in the
case of success (failure) of the projects. Then, the profit made and the capital stock
accumulated are given as
Ft = F
s
t p
H + F ft (1− pH) (3.9)
and
Kt = K
s
t p
H(1− pi) +Kft (1− pH) (3.10)
The profits made in the case of success of the projects, which are invested, and there-
fore transferred to the next period, by the entrepreneurs, are given by the following
equation:
F st = PtYt − piRFtLt − (1− pi)RF,t−1Lt−1 (3.11)
The corresponding capital stock in the case of success of the projects is, therefore,
given as
Kst = F
s
t /Pt + (1− δ)Kt−1 (3.12)
In the case of failure of the firms’ projects, there is no output produced; therefore,
profits are
F ft = −µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt (3.13)
whereas the capital stock is given as
Kft = F
f
t /Pt + (1− δ)Kt−1 = (1− µ)(1− δ)Kt−1 (3.14)
Plugging equations (3.12) and (3.14) into equation (3.10), the capital accumulation
equation given in equation (3.8) is obtained at the micro level.
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Entrepreneurs’ maximization problem is subject to the constraint reflecting the fact
that the firm finances its wage payments with the loans it borrows from the FI. Hence,
it obeys
WtNt ≤ Lt (3.15)
Finally, there is an incentive constraint for the firm to choose the project ”good”:
PtYt −RFtLt ≥ PBKtPt
(pH − pL) (3.16)
As long as this constraint holds, the entrepreneur maximizes profits given in equation
(3.5) that is written for the case of project ”good”. The incentive constraint also gives
the borrowing constraint of the firm
RFtLt ≤ PtYt − PBKtPt
(pH − pL) (3.17)
from which the loan demand, Ldt , is obtained:
Ldt =
PtYt − PBKtPt(pH−pL)
RFt
(3.18)
In the standard collateralized borrowing literature, the maximum amount of loans
supplied to the firms by the FIs is determined according to the value of the collateral
firms have. More precisely, the value of the loans the FIs supply does not exceed the
value of the collateral of the firms, which is exactly what the collateral constraints
imply. However, in those frameworks, the total supply of loans is often fixed (limited).
Therefore, it is an optimal allocation problem of loans and assets (that are used as
collateral) among agents with differing productivities. In the current framework, the
total amount of loans available is determined in part stochastically, due to the fact
that it is the sum of total deposits and the monetary injection the FIs hold and that
the monetary injection is an exogenous stochastic process. As a result, the optimiza-
tion problem here has to do with the allocation of the incoming (injected) new loans
available to the FIs. In the standard CIA literature, where the total supply of loans
is subject to uncertainty similar to our framework here, the allocation problem of the
new loans is solved through the adjustment of the loan rate. To be more specific,
as the total supply of loans increase, the loan rate falls so that the firms continue to
demand the extra loans available, and the FIs continue to supply the extra loans to
the firms as long as their return (the loan rate) is positive. However, in those frame-
works, there is no uncertainty in the production process; therefore, there is no need
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for collateralized borrowing. The major novelty of the framework in this chapter is to
reconcile these two strands of literature with the motivation of analyzing aggregate
fluctuations in the case of risk premium shocks for an economy with uncertainty and
frictions.
For the FI to continue lending the new resources available as loans to firms, the return
on the loans must be positive and greater than the return on any outside option of
the FI; that is,
pHRFt + (1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt+1
Lt
≥ RHt > 0 (3.19)
where RHt represents the return on the outside option of the FI, namely, lending to
other FIs.10 The parameters of the model are calibrated in such a way that the in-
equality holds.
The inequality also gives the loan supply, Lst :
Lst =
(1− pH)µ(1− δ)Kt−1Pt+1
(RHt − pHRFt) (3.20)
The loan market equilibrium condition is obtained through equating the loan supply
and the loan demand equations.
3.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
The objective of the FI is to maximize the expected infinite horizon discounted stream
of dividends it pays to households:
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt+1
Bt
Ct+1Pt+1
}
(3.21)
10The return on loans just has to be positive, once the assumption that FIs can lend to and borrow
from one another is relaxed.
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subject to first the budget constraint
Bt ≤ [pHpiRFtLt+pH(1−pi)RF,t−1Lt−1]+[(1−pH)µ(1−δ)Kt−1Pt]−RH,t−1DDt−1−R∗FDt−1Et−1
(3.22)
where FDt ≥ 0 is denominated in foreign currency and Et is the nominal exchange
rate (the domestic currency value of one unit of the foreign currency). Purchasing
power parity (PPP) holds so that Pt = EtP
∗
t , with P
∗
t denoting the foreign price level.
P ∗t is normalized to 1; therefore, the fluctuations in the exchange rate in response to
the shocks are captured by the movements in the domestic price level. The net present
value of future dividends is discounted by the marginal utility of consumption due to
the fact that financial intermediaries are owned by households and that an extra unit
of dividend is valued by households to the extent that it enables future consumption.
The monetary injection, Xt, and the total deposits at the FI in period t, Dt, are used
by the FI for the period t loans, Lt; therefore, they cancel out in the budget constraint
of the FI.
Xt is the monetary injection during date t, Xt = Mt − Mt−1, defined similarly to
Nason and Cogley (1994).11
The exogenous stochastic process for the growth rate of the monetary injection is
given as
lnmt = (1− ρ)lnm∗ + ρlnmt−1 + M,t, M,t ∼ N(0, σ2M) (3.23)
where mt =
Mt
Mt−1
.
It is therefore an autoregressive stationary process in the growth rate of money, but
an AR(2) with a unit root in the log of the level of money. This can be seen from the
definition of mt which can be rewritten as lnMt = lnMt−1 + lnmt.
The second constraint the FI faces, namely the balance sheet constraint, requires that
the liabilities of the FI are less than or equal to its assets
Dt +Xt ≤ Lt (3.24)
11It can be seen from the households’ budget constraint that Xt equals the total income of house-
holds (labor income+interest on deposits+dividends from the financial intermediaries) minus con-
sumption, which cannot be negative since households are assumed to transfer some cash to the next
period.
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where Dt = DDt + FDtEt and FDtEt = ψDt, DDt = (1− ψ)Dt.
ψ represents the financial openness parameter assumed to be controlled by the finan-
cial regulator and varies between 0 and 1. Higher levels of ψ imply higher degrees of
financial integration.
3.2.4 Government
The government in the economy finances unproductive government purchases de-
nominated in the consumption good, Gt, through raising tax revenues and issuing
one-period government bonds, GBt. Tax revenues are obtained by a time-varying flat
rate tax, τt, on labor income. Government bonds are denominated in foreign currency
and government debt is subject to a partial default risk, with an endogenous default
probability 1 − pRt . To be more precise, probabilistically, the government might not
be able to repay its debt totally. The government budget constraint is then given as
τtWtNt +GBtEt = [p
R
t GBt−1EtR
GB
t−1 + (1− pRt )χGBt−1EtRGBt−1] +GtPt (3.25)
where pRt is the probability with which the government will be able to repay its debt
totally and χ denotes the percentage of the government debt to be repaid in the case of
default. RGBt represents the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds, which
is determined by the following equation:
RGBt = R
∗ +RPt (3.26)
RPt stands for the ”risk premium” that the government has to pay in addition to the
world interest rate, R*, in order to compensate the households, that also have the
option of holding foreign bonds, for the risk of default on the government debt. Risk
premium is determined partly by the probability of default by the government, 1−pRt ,
and partly by a shock to the risk premium:
RPt =
(1− pRt )
pRt
+ RP,t (3.27)
where RP,t denotes the risk premium shock.
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The probability of default, 1−pRt , is a function of the value of the government debt12:
(1− pRt+1) =
eGBtEt − 1
eGBtEt + 1
(3.28)
The government also follows a simple tax rule, adjusting the tax rate in response to
a change in the level of government debt:
τt
τt−1
= λ
GBtEt
GBt−1Et−1
, 0 < λ < 1 (3.29)
where λ might be interpreted as the tax adjustment parameter.
3.2.5 System of Equations
In a stochastic setting, the solution of the model is not a series of numbers that match
a given set of equations, as in a deterministic setting. In a stochastic environment,
the best thing agents can do is to specify a decision, policy or feedback rule for the
future, in other words, their optimal actions contingent on each possible realization of
shocks. Therefore, it is a function satisfying the model’s equilibrium conditions that
is being searched. The system of equations consists of the first-order conditions of
the agents’ optimization problems and the market-clearing conditions of the goods,
labor, money and credit markets.
The first-order conditions of the household’s optimization problem are given as:
(1− φ)
Ct
=
φPt
Wt(1−Ht) (3.30)
from the maximization of the household’s utility function with respect to consumption,
βRHt
Wt+1(1−Ht+1) =
1
Wt(1−Ht) (3.31)
from the maximization with respect to deposits and
12Alternative ways have been proposed in the literature to endogeneize default rates. Uribe
(2006b), for instance, suggests a framework where future default rates are predicted by current
and past fiscal deficits.
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1Wt(1−Ht)(1− τt) =
β[RGBt Et+1(p
R
t − 2e
GBtEtGBtEt
(eGBtEt+1)2
) + χRGBt Et+1(1− pRt + 2e
GBtEtGBtEt
(eGBtEt+1)2
)]
Wt+1(1−Ht+1)(1− τt+1)
(3.32)
from the maximization with respect to government bonds.
Combining (3.30) and (3.31) we have
1
CtPt
=
βRHt
Ct+1Pt+1
(3.33)
From the firm’s optimization problem, there is the binding borrowing constraint
RFtLt(p
H − pL) = PtYt(pH − pL)− PBKtPt (3.34)
and the equilibrium condition that the marginal product of labor equals the real wage
Kαt−1(1− α)(AtNt)−αAt =
Wt
Pt
(3.35)
that are among the equations constituting the solution of the model.
Finally, the FI maximizes its dividends with respect to deposits, which leads to the
following first order condition:
pHpiRFtPt+2Ct+2 = βPt+1Ct+1[(1− ψ)RHt + ψR∗ − pH(1− pi)RFt] (3.36)
As stated above, all markets clear at the equilibrium. The following equations repre-
sent equilibrium in the goods, labor, money, and credit markets, respectively:
Ct + It +Gt +NXt = Yt (3.37)
Nt = Ht (3.38)
PtCt = Mt−1 +Xt (3.39)
Dt +Xt = Lt (3.40)
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NXt denotes net exports, which is equal to the net interest payment on foreign borrow-
ing minus the change in the amount of foreign borrowing in a given period. Therefore,
PtNXt = (R
∗ − 1)FDt−1Et−1 − [FDt−1Et−1 − FDtEt] (3.41)
Combining (3.15), (3.30) and (3.38) gives
(
φ
1− φ)
PtCt
1−Nt =
Lt
Nt
(3.42)
which constitutes another equation of the solution.
Finally, there is the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition
Pt = EtP
∗
t (3.43)
with P ∗t = 1, which is used to convert the foreign currency denominated foreign
deposits, foreign bond holdings and government bond holdings into domestic currency
in the system of equations.
The model, however, needs to be made stationary first so that it can be linearized
around the steady-state and that it returns to the steady-state after a shock. The
problem of non-stationarity arises because of having stochastic trends in money and
technology. In the absence of shocks, real variables grow with At (except Nt which
is stationary since there is no population growth), nominal variables grow with Mt
and prices grow with Mt/At. Detrending is carried out as follows (where hats above
variables denote stationarity):
For real variables, qˆt = qt/At where qt = [Yt, Ct, Kt, It, NXt, Gt]. For nominal vari-
ables, zˆt = zt/Mt where zt = [Wt, Dt, Lt]. For prices, Pˆt = PtAt/Mt−1.
The stationary system of equations is as follows:
(1− φ)(1−Nt)Ltmt = φPtCtNt (3.44)
mtCt+1Pt+1 = βRHtCtPt (3.45)
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1Wt(1−Ht)(1− τt) =
β[RGBt Et+1(p
R
t − 2e
GBtEtGBtEt
(eGBtEt+1)2
) + χRGBt Et+1(1− pRt + 2e
GBtEtGBtEt
(eGBtEt+1)2
)]
Wt+1(1−Ht+1)(1− τt+1)mt+1
(3.46)
RFtLt(p
H − pL)mt = PtYt(pH − pL)− PBKtPt (3.47)
Kαt−1(1− α)a−αt N−αt = Wtmt (3.48)
pHpiRFtPt+2Ct+2mt+1 = βPt+1Ct+1[(1− ψ)RHt + ψR∗ − pH(1− pi)RFt] (3.49)
Ct + It +Gt +NXt = Yt (3.50)
PtCt = mt (3.51)
DDt
(1− ψ) + 1−
1
mt
= Lt (3.52)
WtNt = Lt (3.53)
Yt = K
α
t−1a
−α
t N
1−α
t (3.54)
Ktat = p
H [piµ(1− δ)Kt−1 + (1− pi)(Itat + (1− δ)Kt−1)] + (1− pH)(1− µ)(1− δ)Kt−1
(3.55)
NXt = ψ[(R
∗ − 1)DDt−1 −DDt−1 +DDtmt]/(1− ψ)Pt (3.56)
τtWtNtmt +GBtEtmt = [p
R
t GBt−1EtR
GB
t−1 + (1− pRt )χGBt−1EtRGBt−1] +GtPt (3.57)
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τt
τt−1
= λ(
GBtEt
GBt−1Et−1
)mt (3.58)
RGBt −R∗ =
(1− pRt )
pRt
+ RP,t (3.59)
(1− pRt+1) =
eGBtEt − 1
eGBtEt + 1
(3.60)
Pt = Et (3.61)
Given the equations (3.44)-(3.61) and the risk premium shock given in (3.27), the
expected future paths of the variables [Yt, Ct, It, NXt, Pt, DDt, Lt, Nt, Kt, Wt, GBt,
Gt, τt, p
R
t , Et, RFt, RHt, R
GB
t ], namely, the impulse response functions, conditional
on temporary risk premium shocks in period 1 are obtained next.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Simulation
The procedure of making the model stationary is followed by linearization and simula-
tion.13 The model is linearized up to first order.14 The perturbation method employed
to solve and to simulate the model can be summarized as follows: The solution to
the system of equations obtained in the previous section is a set of equations relating
variables in the current period to the past state of the system and current shocks, that
satisfy the original system. These are referred to as ”the policy functions”. In the lin-
earization up to first order, future shocks enter the linearized system of equations only
with their first moments (which are zero in expectations); therefore, they drop out
when taking expectations of the equations. This is why certainty equivalence holds
in the system linearized up to first order. The (approximate) policy functions are
obtained by first rewriting the system in terms of past variables, current and future
shocks, and then linearizing it around the steady states. Impulse response functions
are then acquired simply through iterating the policy functions starting from some
initial values (given by the steady states).15
For simulations, the following values are assigned to the structural parameters of the
model: α=0.32, β=0.99, φ=0.76, δ=0.025, γ=0.003, ρ=0.7.16 The success probability
of project ”bad”, pL, is set equal to 0.1. The fraction of the capital stock to be used
as collateral by firms, µ, is taken to be equal to 0.1, whereas the probability of death
of firm managers, pi, is set to 0.6. The parameter measuring the private benefits of
entrepreneurs from project ”bad”, PB, is taken as 0.5. The fraction of the debt on
13The linearization and the simulation of the model are carried out using DYNARE, which is a
pre-processor and a collection of MATLAB routines that have been developed to support modern
macro modeling.
14In the case of linearization up to the first order, agents behave as if future shocks were equal to
zero (since their expectation is null), due to certainty equivalence. In the linearization up to second
order, agents make their decisions knowing that the future value of innovations are random but
will have zero mean. This is not the same thing because of Jensen’s inequality. For more detailed
information, see DYNARE User Guide.
15The impulse response functions presented in the next section depict the responses of the variables
in terms of deviations from the steady states.
16For the parameter values, Mendoza (1991), Nason and Cogley (1994) and Dib (2003) are followed.
Dib (2003) employs quarterly Canadian data for the calibration and the estimation in his small-open-
economy DSGE model.
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which the government defaults, χ, is assigned the value 0.7. The tax adjustment pa-
rameter, λ, is calibrated to 0.99.
Three parameters are of special interest, namely, ψ -the parameter measuring the de-
gree of financial frictions, pH -the success probability of project ”good”, and R∗ -the
gross interest rate on foreign deposits. These parameters are interrelated through
equation (3.49), which relates the loan rate, the interest rate on domestic deposits
and the interest rate on foreign deposits. Simulations are run using the following
sets of values for those parameters: ψ = [0.5, 0.7, 0.9], R∗ = [1.01, 1.001, 1.0001], and
pH = [0.7, 0.8, 0.9]. In the next section, the impulse response functions are presented.17
17In a stochastic setup, DYNARE computes impulse response functions, by default, for one positive
standard deviation of each of the shocks.
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3.3.2 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 3.1: Temporary Risk Premium Shock (1/2)
Figure 3.1 displays the impulse response functions of the variables in the model in the
case of a positive, one-time, temporary risk premium shock in period 1.18 The positive
risk premium shock leads directly to an increase in the interest rate on government
bonds, which leads to a contraction in the amount of government bonds supplied
by the government. The risk premium shock also causes an increase in the nominal
exchange rate; that is, a depreciation in the exchange rate. Due to the fact that the tax
rate growth is proportional to the growth of the total value of the government debt,
according to the simple tax rule followed by the government, the tax rate increases in
response to the risk premium shock. Determined partly by the size of the exchange
rate depreciation and partly by the tax adjustment parameter, the increase in the
government revenue leads consequently to an expansion in government spending.
18The values used in the simulations that lead to the impulse responses presented here are ψ = 0.9,
R∗ = 1.01, pH = 0.9 and λ = 0.99.
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Figure 3.2: Temporary Risk Premium Shock (2/2)
In response to the rise in the price level, households reduce their consumption. Do-
mestic deposit holdings by households, on the other hand, increase since the supply
of government bonds is lower due to the higher costs of borrowing for the govern-
ment. As deposits rise, so do total loans available for firms. However, the increase in
the amount of loans does not consequently lead to an increase in employment, and
subsequently in production, as a result of the rise in the distorting tax rate creat-
ing disincentives to work and thereby causing a fall in the labor supply. Therefore,
output also falls in response to the positive risk premium shock. The fall in output
and investment in the case of a positive risk premium shock confirms in a monetary
framework the findings of the RBC literature for open economies.19
19See, among others, Uribe (2006a).
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3.4 Conclusion
Aggregate fluctuations in the case of risk premium shocks are analyzed in this chapter
of the thesis for a small open economy. The business cycle in a dynamic, stochastic,
general equilibrium framework with financial and informational frictions is investi-
gated in response to positive, temporary risk premium shocks. The risk premium
arises in the model due to the existence of a government sector that borrows domesti-
cally with a partial default risk. More specifically, in order to be able to compensate
the domestic households, that also have the option of holding foreign securities, for the
default risk involved in the government bonds, the government offers some risk pre-
mium in addition to the international interest rate prevailing for the foreign bonds. A
risk premium shock, therefore, affects the investment decisions of households in terms
of relative asset holdings. It also has implications for government spending, which is
supposed to be financed through domestic borrowing and taxation.
Risk premium is, by definition, an issue of relevance for emerging economies that are
exposed to risks of default on debt due to their lack of adequately developed finan-
cial and macroeconomic infrastructure. Therefore, the implications of risk premium
shocks for aggregate fluctuations are of special importance for emerging economies,
that are also facing financial frictions. These two crucial aspects of emerging markets;
namely, exposure to default risk and financial frictions, are combined in this chapter
in a DSGE framework with informational frictions and uncertainty in the production
process. Informational asymmetries among the agents in the economy and uncertainty
in the production process necessitate financial intermediation in the economy. The
Holmstrom-Tirole type of uncertainty in the production process also leads to collat-
eralized borrowing by firms, which requires special attention to the design of the loan
contracts between the firms and the financial intermediaries.
The small open economy DSGE model developed in this chapter is solved and sim-
ulated in the case of positive, one-time, temporary risk premium shocks. The model
predicts an increase in the interest rate on government bonds and in the nominal ex-
change rate in response to the shock. The depreciation in the exchange rate increases
the value of the government bonds in terms of the domestic currency, which leads to a
rise in the tax rate due to the simple tax rule followed by the government. Determined
partly by the size of the exchange rate depreciation and partly by the tax adjustment
parameter, the increase in the amount of the tax revenue of the government, accom-
panied by a decrease in the government borrowing due to higher costs of repayment
112
for the government, leads to an increase in the government spending. In response to
the rise in the price level, households reduce their consumption. Domestic deposit
holdings by households, on the other hand, increase since the supply of government
bonds is lower due to the higher costs of borrowing for the government. As deposits
rise, so do total loans available for firms. However, the increase in the amount of
loans does not consequently lead to an increase in employment, and subsequently in
production, because of the fact that the rise in the distorting tax rate creates disin-
centives to work and thereby causes a fall in the labor supply. Therefore, output also
falls in response to the positive risk premium shock.
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Conclusion
Financial frictions have long been investigated in the literature in terms of their busi-
ness cycle implications. Especially over the last two decades, theoretical progress as
a result of the developments in economics of information and incentives made it pos-
sible to analyze asymmetries and imperfections in financial markets. The literature
has focused on a wide array of issues related to financial frictions such as the way
financial frictions are captured, the financial infrastructure of the economies featuring
those frictions and the interaction between those frictions and other imperfections
in an economy. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by proposing new
theoretical frameworks to examine aggregate fluctuations in the case of technology,
money growth and risk premium shocks and amplification mechanisms under decreas-
ing financial frictions, taking into account informational asymmetries and uncertainty
in the production processes.
In the first chapter of this thesis, aggregate fluctuations and propagation mechanisms
under varying degrees of financial openness are analyzed for a real, small open econ-
omy. Using a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework with financial in-
termediation and foreign borrowing, the implications of increasing financial openness
for the impact of temporary technology shocks on the economy are investigated. The
chapter contributes to the literature through examining the business cycle in a small
open economy with financial frictions, taking into account informational imperfec-
tions and uncertainty. Informational asymmetries among the agents in the economy
and uncertainty in the production process necessitate financial intermediation and
collateralized borrowing in the economy. Abstraction from money in the setup of
the framework enables to concentrate on the real implications of increasing financial
openness for the impact of technology shocks, business cycle implications of which
have long been discussed in the literature.
The simulation experiments with different levels of financial openness reveal that in-
creasing financial openness amplifies the impact of positive, temporary technology
shocks on output, investment, consumption, labor supply and net exports. This is
mainly due to the fact that the promoting effect of a positive technology shock on
the economy is coupled with the improving impact of increasing financial openness
on output led by increasing access to cheaper foreign funds. The model confirms the
findings of the real business cycle literature on small open economies and the empirical
regularities typical of open economies in terms of the procyclicality of investment and
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labor supply and the countercyclicality of external trade. In addition, there is a pos-
itive correlation between savings and investment, which is in line with the empirical
evidence pointed out in the business cycle literature for small open economies under
imperfect capital mobility.
Sensitivity analyses carried out show that the simulation results obtained in the case
of positive, temporary technology shocks are robust. Analyzing the impact of mon-
etary shocks, as well as technology shocks, on an economy under varying degrees of
financial openness might allow one to gain insights into the design of optimal mone-
tary policy in the case of varying levels of financial openness. This might have crucial
implications especially for emerging economies, for most of which the process of fi-
nancial liberalization has not yet been completed. Therefore, introducing money into
the real framework in Chapter 1 and thereby analyzing the policy implications of in-
creasing financial openness for small open economies might be interesting, and hence,
constitutes the motivation of Chapter 2.
The second chapter of the thesis examines the business cycle implications of increasing
financial integration for a small open economy. Extending the dynamic, stochastic,
general equilibrium framework with financial and informational frictions in Chapter 1
in such a way as to incorporate money into the economy, the impact of money growth
and technology shocks on the aggregate economic activity is investigated under vary-
ing degrees of financial integration. Financial frictions in the model are in the form
of restrictions on the composition of deposits held by the financial intermediaries in
the economy. More specifically, financial intermediaries are assumed to be able to
hold no more than a certain fraction of their total deposits as foreign deposits. An
increase in this fraction implies decreasing financial frictions that is interpreted as
increasing financial integration here. Informational frictions among the agents in the
model necessitate financial intermediation in the economy. Finally, Holmstrom-Tirole
type of uncertainty in the production process leads to collateralized borrowing by the
firms, where the capital stock of the firms serves as the collateral as well as the factor
of production.
The small open economy DSGE model developed in the second chapter of this thesis
predicts an expansion in output, consumption, investment, labor demand and loans
in response to a positive, temporary monetary shock; whereas a positive, tempo-
rary technology shock leads to an increase in output, investment, domestic deposits,
loans, labor demand and net exports, and a decrease in consumption. The simula-
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tion experiments with different levels of financial integration reveal that increasing
financial integration amplifies the impact of temporary monetary shocks on output,
consumption, investment, labor demand and loans. The amplification effect of in-
creasing financial integration is due to the mechanism in which the output-promoting
impact of positive monetary injection is coupled with increasing access to cheaper
foreign funds that enhance production through leading to a rise in the loanable funds
available for firms. The increase in the amount of funds available for firms due to a
positive monetary injection leads to a rise in the amount of loans actually given to
the firms through a fall in the loan rate, which is stimulated further by increasing
financial integration that raises the volume of cheaper foreign funds held by financial
intermediaries. The effect of increasing financial integration in the case of temporary
technology shocks is found to be rather negligible. The sensitivity analyses undertaken
reveal that our results regarding the impact of temporary monetary and technology
shocks on a small open economy are robust.
Finally, in the third chapter of this thesis, risk premium shocks are investigated in
terms of their implications for aggregate fluctuations in a small open economy. A
government sector that borrows domestically with an endogenous partial default risk
is incorporated into the dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium framework in Chap-
ter 2. The risk premium arises in the model due to the default risk, for which the
domestic lenders, that also have the option of holding foreign securities, must be com-
pensated by the government. A risk premium shock, therefore, affects the investment
decisions of households in terms of relative asset holdings. It also has implications for
government spending, which is supposed to be financed through domestic borrowing
and taxation.
In response to a positive, temporary risk premium shock, the model developed in
Chapter 3 predicts an increase in the interest rate on government bonds and in the
nominal exchange rate. The depreciation in the exchange rate increases the value of
the government bonds in terms of the domestic currency, which leads to a rise in the
tax rate due to the simple tax rule followed by the government. Determined partly by
the size of the exchange rate depreciation and partly by the tax adjustment param-
eter, the increase in the amount of the tax revenue of the government, accompanied
by a decrease in the government borrowing due to higher costs of repayment for the
government, leads to an increase in the government spending. In response to the rise
in the price level, households reduce their consumption. Domestic deposit holdings
by households, on the other hand, increase since the supply of government bonds is
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lower. As deposits rise, so do total loans available for firms. However, the increase
in the amount of loans does not consequently lead to an increase in employment, and
subsequently in production, due to the rise in the distorting tax rate creating disin-
centives to work and thereby causing a fall in the labor supply. Therefore, output
also falls in response to the positive risk premium shock.
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